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This paper has been prepared as part of a larger examination 
of  past and future directions in highway safety sponsored by the 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association under a gran't of unre- 
s t r ic ted  funds t o  The iJn iversi  ty of Hi chi gan ' s  Highway Safety 
Research Ins t i tu te .  I t  has also evolved from work conducted under 
the sponsorshi? o f  the U .  S. Department o f  Transportation i n  a study 
ent i t led  " A  Systems Analysis of the Traffic Law System," completed 
in 1972 .  
This paper was originally scheduled for release for  review 
by our colleagues in the f ie ld  of  highway safety i n  early 1978. 
Current discussions on the future o f  highway safety n o w  being 
conducted in the p u b 1  i c  a n d  private sector(e.9.  , the Automobile 
Assessment Study conducted by the Ofii ce of Techno1 ogy Assessment) 
have led us t o  release the document ea r l i e r  than scheduled. !4e 
do so in the hope that  some of the issues we raise  will receive 
more scrutiny because of the current in te res t  in the topic and 
that  our conceptual approach will be strengthened by the comments 
of the readers. 
Early release o f  this document has n o t  allowed us to complete 
a rigorous internal review process. Thus, the paper exhibits 
s t y l i s t i c  flaws, and some of the discussions are n o t  as complete 
as we expect the final version t o  present. We we1 come suggest- 
ions for improvement of  both the substance and presentation 
approach o f  the paper. 
The pager i s  being circulated for comment within the highway 
saS2ty res2arch a n d  policy communities. I n  l igh t  o f  ;he prelimin- 
ary nature o f  the  document and  the prcbabi l i t y  t h a t  i t  di 11 be 

substantially revised vay we ask that any use of the content, 
for other than review purposes, be discussed with us i n  advance of 
such use. 
We t h a n k  the readers for the i r  consideration. 
Kent B .  Joscel yn Ralph K. Jones 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The Highway Transportation Sys tern a n d  the omnipresent auto- 
mobile are as much a part o f  American l i f e  as apple pie. The 
societal mobi 1 i t y  provided by the auto, as a personal transporta- 
tion unit ,  has shaped our society for bet ter  and for worse. 
Along with the mobility that  the auto has provided, auto use has 
resulted in death, personal in jury,  and property losses because 
of t r a f f i c  crashes. These t r a f f i c  crashes represent a societal  
r isk that must be managed. 
This paper examines general concepts and theori es developed 
t o  explain t r a f f i c  crashes and support effor ts  t o  reduce crashes 
and crash losses. We are concerned with the macro-theory that 
support the broad concept of highway safety,  as opposed t o  micro- 
theories that explain some special aspect of  the crash problem 
or a societal  response. We are interested in identifying and 
examining the general explanations that  1 ink the micro-theories 
t o  provi de di rection for the highway safety effor t .  
This examination has been undertaken t o  develop' a more 
systematic frame of reference for evaluation of past approaches 
and for  development of future approaches t o  management of the 
t r a f f i c  crash risk. 
This paper developed from a more general inquiry that i s  
examining what has been done i n  the  f ie ld  of highway safety.  The 
objectives o f  the inquiry are t o  develop recommendations for the 
direct'on of future programs and t o  identify the research neces- 
sary t o  support f u t ~ r e  highway safety e f for t s .  
As a f i r s t  step in this inquiry, a general l i t e r a tu re  
review was undertaken. As the l i t e ra tu re  base was amassed, i t  
became apparent that  some conceptual scheme w o u l d  be necessary 
t o  organize and synthesize past research findings a n d  program 
ac t iv i t ies .  Thus, we focused on identifying existing theory t o  
develop a conceptual framework for organizing existing knowledge 
and identifying gaps that should be addressed by further research. 
While our search revealed many micro-theories (e.g. , math 
models o f  vehicle dynamics) that  f o l  low general l y  accepted 
sc i en t i f i c  practices t o  explain and describe specifi  c aspects of  
highway safety,  we did n o t  f i n d  a we1 1-developed body of 1 i ter-  
ature describing a macro-theory o f  highway saftey. As we noted 
the absence of formally stated general theory, we became aware 
simultaneously of the general disorder o f  the f ie ld.  I n  view of 
the function that theory performs for inquiry and action, such 
disorder might be viewed as predictabl e. Nonethe? ess , the magni - 
tude of  the disorder came as a surprise. We concluded that  many 
inconsistencies could be explained by the lack of a general, 
formal , theoretical foundation for  the f ie ld.  If this  concl usion 
i s  valid, i t  follows that unless a general conceptual framework 
i s  developed, the future i s  a p t  t o  be as disordered as the past. 
I t  i s  appropriate here t o  discuss a moment the function that 
theory performs for  a f ie ld  of endeavor. Theory i s  a concern of  
the researcher and the academician, b u t  i t  i s  n o t  the i r  province 
alone. Theory has s ignif icant  implications for the practi t ioner 
and for the public. Theory has been spoken of as a map t o  guide 
both inquiry a n d  action. Without theory, inquiry and action 
move b1 indly, ineff ic ient ly ,  and often ineffectively.  
The basic functicr! of theory is  explanation. ?, ~ k e o ~ j  7% 
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theories n o t  on;y explain b u t  usual 1;; also a i ; o w  prediction. 
Theories are n o t  simply approaches for research or action. They 
are more than a framework for  investigation. By positing rela- 
tionships that can be verified or denied by empirical findings, 
theories provide an ef f ic ien t  means of advancing our understand- 
ing of the phenomena in question. 
The broader understanding that flows from a macro-theory or 
a conceptual framework has s ignif icant  practical import. The 
conceptual framework provides ( I) a method of organizing exis t-  
ing knowledge; ( 2 )  principles and rules for  making decisions; 
( 3 )  a way t o  focus inquiry; ( 4 )  a common communication system, 
and ( 5 )  order and direction for act ivi ty .  These are a l l  needed 
in the f ie ld  of highway safety. 
We do n o t  suggest that the f ie ld  of  highway safety i s  
devoid of theory. Limited conceptual frameworks ex is t  and  are 
used. Macro-theories have been suggested in the past b u t  are n o t  
i n  use today. What i s  lacking i s  a rigorous discussion o f  the 
theoretical underpinnings of the research and program ef for t s  
that  form the f ie ld  of highway safety today. 
This paper has been developed t o  draw together the basic 
l i te ra ture  on highway safety theory, discuss i t s  l imitations,  
and raise  for  discussion a conceptual framework that may be 
useful in ordering present knowledge a n d  suggesting future 
directions. The primary objective of this  paoer i s  t o  stimulate 
discussion of highway safety theory and i t s  appl ications. 
1.2 Scope and Aoproach 
This paper has been deliberately Timited t o  discussion o f  
top-level ccncepts. Any attempt t a  deal inclusively with a l i  
issues of highway safety,  assuming the task could be accomplished, 
would have produced an unworkable document. Therefore, this 
Faper leads a reader through the major theor2ticai issues,  and, 
a t  the same time provides scrne factual information on traf'ic 
crash risk a n d  approaches for managing that risk. 
The remainder of this  paper i s  divided into three major 
parts. The f i r s t ,  which includes chapters 2 and 3,  presents a 
summary of existing theories of  highway safety and discusses 
their  limitations. 
The second part ,  chapters J ,  5 ,  a n d  6 ,  introduces a new 
theory a n d  important related concepts. Chapter 4 presents a new 
conceptual framework for explanation a n d  examination of the 
highway safety process. Chapters 5 and  6 present related theory 
and  information from other fields.  We believe an understanding 
of  these concepts i s  necessary t o  improve the management of the 
t r a f f i c  crash risk. 
The third part discusses the applicaticn o f  the new frame- 
work a n d  related theory t o  the problems of  highway safety 
(chapter 7 ) ,  and some imp1 ications for future research and  
action (chapter 8 ) .  Chapter 9 presents our conclusions and 
recomrnen da ti ons . 
We must emphasize that this paper i s  presented i n  the 
context of discovery. I t  i s  intended to raise issues and 
stimul a t e  ctiscussicn , and n o t  necessarily t o  resolve questions 
or prescribe solutions. We hope that i t  may contribute t o  
some short-term solutions, b u t ,  more important, we hope t h a t  i t  
wi 11 produce more rigorous ccnceptual frameworks tha t ,  in turn, 
will permit development of more effective ways t o  wanage the 
ri s k of traf f i  c crashes. 
2 . 0  HISTORY OF HIGHWAY SAFETY THEORY 
This chapter presents brief descriptions of the major "theories" 
of highway safety that have appeared in the l i t e ra tu re  of the l a s t  
f i f t y  years. 
The role of theory was discussed briefly in the introduction. 
Additional information i s  presented in the following section t o  
emphasize the importance a n d  relevance of theory for the f ie ld  of 
highway safety. 
Next, a review of the l i te ra ture  i s  presented. Many of  the 
models and conceptual frameworks discussed were not presented by 
their  authors as general theories of highway safety. They were 
offered t o  aid i n  the explanation of the t r a f f i c  crash problem and 
to guide action t o  reduce crash losses. While they may n o t  have 
been formal ly 1 abel ed "theory", they have performed that ro1 e for 
the f ie ld.  Thus, we present a n d  examine them as theory because 
they constitute the existing highway safety theory. 
2 .1  The Need for Theory 
In any f i e ld ,  theory i s  necessary to provide a rat ional ,  
consistent basis for analysis and action. In  highway safety,  
theory i s  especially important because of the complexity o f  
problems that touch almost every aspect o f  daily l i f e  and contain 
a bewildering array of interrelated economic, social , po l i t i ca l ,  
and technological factors. 
When we examine the way i n  which highway safety programs develop, 
i t  appears that conventional wisdom prevails. Beliefs in the 
effectiveness o f  certain approaches are he1 d too  tenaciously from 
the perspective of experience or perhaps intuit ion. I n  many cases 
programs are csn tinued simply because they seem reasonable. Un f3r- 
tunately, re1 iance on experience and in-cuition, which appear t o  3s 
the basis for conventional wisdom, has a predictable outcsme. blew 
ideas will "look" l ike old ones. 
A rigorous application of theory can address mzny of the problem 
that ar ise  from the application of conventional wisdom. F i r s t ,  the 
use of  theory leads t o  a bet ter  understanding of  the problem. This 
understanding provides more objective c r i t e r i a  for testing the 
reasonableness of proposed programs as well as suggesting new 
approaches a n d  new ideas. The value o f  such a systematic or 
sc ien t i f ic  approach i s  we11 es tab1 ished. 
A fundamental use of  theory i s  i n  organizing existing knowledge. 
W i  t h  highway safety,  this  means k n o w l  edge about the causes, con- 
di t ions,  a n d  consequences of crashes a n d  about ways of dealing with 
the problems of crashes. Knowledge must be organized so that  
elements involved in the generation of crashes and  crash losses are 
related t o  element; involved in the reduction of the frequency and 
severity of crashes. As will be seen l a t e r  in this paper, past 
paradigms of highway safety have n o t  combined these two categories 
of k n o w l  edge in t o  a s ingle ,  integrated conceptual framework. 
A second role of theory i s  in generating principles and  rules 
for  making decisions. A practical theory provides a basis for de- 
ciding what actions should be taken t o  achieve desired results.  
This flows from the ab i l i t y  of a theory t o  explain and predict. I n  
highway safety,  a theory should help decide how best t o  deal !with 
a given type of crash brought about by a particular s e t  of circum- 
stances under a specified se t  of ccndi tions. I n  a similar sense, 
theory should provide guide1 ines for  establ ishing pr ior i t ies  among 
problems and courses o f  action for resolving problems. Theory 
cannot be expected t o  provide a foolproof recipe for dealing with 
t r a f f i c  crashes. i t  may be expected t o  provide a s e t  o f  principles 
for eff ic ient ly  devel c ~ i n g  detai led prescriptive measures. 
Another important use of theory i s  i n  directing inquiry. A 
theory that is  b o t h  probiem-oriented and action-oriented assis ts  i n  
dete rmin ing  t h e  i n  f o r n a t i o n  r e q u i r e d  t o  develop t h e  know1 edge base 
necessary f o r  decis ion-making. I t  w i l l  suggest  new areas o f  research 
and new programs. Th is  f ocus ing  e f f e c t  o f  t heo ry  makes bo th  research 
and a c t i o n  more e f f i c i e n t .  
Theory a l s o  he lps by improv inq  communication. I t  prov ides  a 
common s e t  o f  terms, d e f i n i t i o n s ,  and r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  Th is  a l l ows  
researchers ,  p r a c t i t i o n e r s ,  and po l  icymakers t o  speak t o  each o t h e r  
and t o  o t h e r  concerned i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  a common language. There i s  a 
g r e a t  need f o r  improved communication i n  t h e  f i e l d  o f  highway sa fe ty .  
' 
Ex i , s t i ng  knowledge must be e f f e c t i v e l y  shared and a more common 
unders tanding o f  problems developed. 
I n  summary, theory  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  b r i n g  o r d e r  i n t o  a f i e l a  
which a t  t imes appears t o  be a lmost  hope less l y  complex. Theory i s  a 
necessary requi rement  f o r  a c t i o n  programs as we1 1. Wi thou t  adequate 
theory ,  one i s  reduced t o  shoo t i ng  i n  t h e  dark  a t  an undef ined t a r g e t  
. 
w i t h  an unknown weapon. 'rli t h  t heo ry ,  one can p r o d u c t i v e l y  d i r e c t  
a c t i v i t y  toward e s t a b l i s h e d  goa ls .  
One o t h e r  a t t r i b u t e  o f  a good theory  must be mentioned. A 
"good" theory  p rov ides  f o r  t e s t i n g  o f  i t s  content .  A good t heo ry  i s  
dynamic. I t  promotes evo l  u t i o n  , even when the  t e s t i n g  process 
r e s u l t s  i n  replacement o f  t h e  t heo ry  w i t h  another .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  a 
bad theory  does n o t  f a c i  1 i t a t e  t e s t i n g  o r  r e j e c t i o n .  
One c o u l d  read  t he  fo rego ing  and conc l  ude t h a t  n o t h i n g  happens 
w i t h o u t  theory .  I n  a sense t h a t  i s  t r ue .  The problem i s  t h a t  t h i ngs  
happen w i t h  "bad" t h e o r i e s - - t h e o r i e s  t h a t  have n o t  been t es ted ,  
t h a t  a re  n o t  we11 founded, and t h a t  promote d i s o r d e r  and confusion. 
Highway s a f e t y  a c t i v i t i e s  have n o t  stopped f o r  l a c k  of a body of 
sound theory .  However, development and use o f  sound theory  w i l l  
s i gn  i t'i can t l y  improve t he  d i r e c t i o n  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  f d t u r e  
e f f o r t s .  
2 .2  Formation of  Highway Safety Theory 
A1 though official ,  concern over highway safety i n  the United 
States had been expressed since the early 1920s, n o t  until the mid- 
1960s were attempts made t o  develop comprehensive theories for 
understanding a n d  attacking the problem. Six National Conferences 
on Street and  Highway Safety ( in  1924, 1926, 1930, 1934, 1946, a n d  
1949) had failed t o  produce even an adequate foundation for a 
nationwide program in Highway Safety (I), a1 t h o u g h  some topics of 
major concern were identified and described. In reviewing the s t a t e  
of  knowledge i n  the f ie ld  circa 1952, the National Academy of 
Science's Highway Safety Research Correlation Conference ( 2 )  
observed that  despite a need for  "large-scale research involving 
systematic study of interrelated variables ," nos t research had been 
re1 atively small -scale effor ts  " t o  sol ve an imedi a te  problem, or 
isolated studies carried on by individual investigators w i t h  re1 a- 
tively small resources t a  call upon." The report recommended 
several broad areas of driver-oriented research, b u t  the areas were 
n o t  comprehensive a n d  no  structure was presented for generating the 
integrated program called for. An additional stimulus for  an 
organized attack on the problem resulted from a 1958 meeting of the 
President's Committee for  Traffic Safety, b u t  most of the recommend- 
ations followed a "shopping l i s t "  format and were not expl ici t ly  
related to any overall strategy o f  research and action ( 3 ) .  
Meanwhile, highway crash losses continued t o  mount. By 1966, 
annual t r a f f i c  deaths exceeded 53,G00, ( 4 )  and the President requested 
Congress t o  i n i t i a t e  an "aggressive highway safety program" ( 1) .  
The immediate response was in the form of two pieces of legis lat ion,  
the Highway Safety Act o f  1955 ( P . L .  89-564) and the National Traffic 
and  Motor Vehicle Act of 1966 ( P .  L .  89-563). The Acts created V1vo 
federal agencies t o  administer 3 national program of  highway safety.  
The agencies were f i r s t  established l ~ i  thin the Department of  Commerce, 
b u t  the Departinent of Transportaticn ,Act cf 1966 ( P . L .  89-570) 
redesigned the tsJo agencies as bureaus and assigned them t o  the new 
Department of Transportation (DOT).  I n  1967 two bureaus were 
combined into a single Uational Highway Safety Bureau (NHSB) and 
placed under D O T ' S  Federal Highway Admi ni s tration ( F H W A )  where i t  
remained un ti1 1970. In  1970 NHSB was organized as the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) ,. a separate element 
of DOT. 
This f1 urry of federal act ivi ty  was accompanied and followed 
by a variety of separate effor ts  t o  "re-think" the ent i re  problem 
of highway safety. I n  1966 the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Assoc- 
iation (MVMA) sponsored the landmark "An ,i\nalysis o f  the State  of 
the Art of Traffic Safety," by Arthur D.  L i t t l e ,  Inc. ( 5 ) .  The auto- 
mobile industry and the insurance industry establ ished new programs 
of  extramural research ( 6 ,  7 )  , and the R A N D  Corporation was com- 
missioned by NHSB t o  develop a comprehensive approach t o  highway 
safety ( 8 ) .  Numerous conferences were held t o  define future pro- 
grams of  research a n d  action (10 ,  11). 
As a resul t ,  several conceptual frameworks and  theories of  
highway safety began t o  emerge. The f i r s t  of these grew o u t  of a 
simple c1 assi f i  cation scheme that had been imp1 ic i  t l y  accepted 
since the 1920s b u t  had not been formally articulated until the 
la te  1940s when the concept of  highway safety as a public health 
problem began t o  gain support (12) .  Types of factors re1 ated t o  
highway crashes were likened t o  types of factors considered in the 
epidemiologic approach t o  the control of diseases by actions 
against the host, the agent, and the environment. In  the pub1 i c  
health metaphor, the "disease" of highway crashes could be dealt 
w i t h  by measures aimed a t  the driver ( the hos t ) ,  the vehicle ( the 
agent),  a n d  the highway ( the  environment). 
In 1966 Haddon and  arenner of NHTSA added another dimension to 
the public health ccnceptualization of highway safety,  asserting 
that losses from highway crashes resul t  from a sequence of three 
phases o f  interactions of the dri ver-vehi cl e-highway factors (13 ) .  
The three phases were defined as the time period preceding the 
crash, the tirrie period during the crash, a n d  the time period follow- 
ing the crash. The categories of factors were generalized t o  
include human, vehicle and equipment, and environment. Those were 
matched against the three phases t o  form a nine-cell matrix (Figure 
2-1). This formulation was offered as a paradigm for highway safety 
in classifying present know1 edge, research, or "countermeasures" t o  
reduce crash losses (14 ) .  
While Haddon a n d  Bremer were developing their  framework in 
the 1960s, other researchers were recommending that highway safety 
adopt a "systems approach ,"* a term that was n o t  ful ly  understood a t  
the time and was often used as a synonym for  "comprehensive. " 
Frequently, these systems approaches were vague, incompletely s ta ted ,  
and oversimplified. Many of their  originators were operations 
research special is ts  and engineers fresh o u t  of the aerospace and  
defense sectors ,  a n d  the tools of these. professions were confidently 
offered as ready-made solutions t o  a largely analogous s e t  of 
probl ems. 
Arthur D. L i t t l e ,  Inc. ( 5 ,  15) advocated a systems analysis 
"methodology" that  f i r s t  focused on defining the objectf ves of  
highway safety,  next considered a1 t ema t i  ve approaches t o  achieving 
those objectives, and then applied cost-effectiveness techniques t o  
selecting preferred a1 ternati  ves (See Figure 2 - 2 ) .  The selection of  
objectives was seen as the "simplest task," the major diff icul ty  
being the jdentification and  selection of alternatives for achieving 
those objectives ( the  objective was stated to be a reduction in "a 
m i x  of f a t a l i t s e s ,  injur ies ,  and property los s" ) .  The immediate 
need Idas t o  "determine causes of  crashes ," a n d  the resulting review 
* The 'diliiamsburcj Conference in 1958 ( 3 )  also recommended a 
"systerns aoorsach t o  traf;'ic flow a n d  driver behaviora' o l ; t  
did n o t  describe what was meant by the terms and did n o t  
present a concept~al framework for a p p l y i n g  i t .  
FIGURE 2-1 :  GENERALIZED VERSION CF THE HADDON-BRENNER MODEL 











FISURE 2-2:  ARTHUR D ,  L I T T L E  CONCEPTUAL FRAMENGRK FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY 
PROGRAMS COST AND ACTION 
WlCTIVfMSS PROGRAMS 
Source: Reference 15 
of crash causation research by Arthur D .  L i t t l e  (15)  used the Haddon- 
Brenner scheme for classifying current knowledge about causal factors. 
An additional category ("Regulatory a n d  Legal Factors") was used for 
classifying know1 edge about methods o f  reducing crash losses. 
As noted above, the National Highway Safety Sureau ( N H S B )  com- 
missioned the R A N D  Corporation to perform a "preliminary study of 
highway safety measures." The results of the study were published 
in seven volumes in 1968. The f i r s t  three volumes (16 ,  8, 9 )  were 
expl ici t ly  directed toward development of a "conceptual framework 
for  a systems model." The framework ultimately developed in the 
study dealt  principally with the events immediately surrounding a 
crash and was primarily concerned w i t h  the driver and his inter-  
actions w i t h  the vehicle (Figure 2 - 3 ) .  In  the RAND framework, the 
sequence of events became the "Pre-Acci den t Stage," the " Intra- 
Accident Stage," and the "Post-Accident Stage," and each stage was 
broken down into smaller "phases. " A 1  though a variety of factors 
involved in the stages and phases were discussed, the factors were 
not expf ic i  t l y  categorized as human, vehicular, and environmental 
in the conceptual framework. 
The most comprehensive of the theories and conceptual frame- 
works generated by the systems analysts of the mid-1960s were 
developed a t  The University of Michigan i n  the course of  ac t iv i t i e s  
conducted t o  establish the Highway Safety Research Ins t i tu te .  I n  a 
1967 report ( 6 ) ,  Bonder focused on the nation's highway transporta- 
tion systems and a hierarchy of i t s  subsystems (e .g . ,  the vehicle, the 
human operator, the highway, the casual ty recovery faci 1 i t i e s )  and i t s  
components ( e .g . ,  such vehicular components as engines, transmissions , 
e tc .  ) . Highway safety Nas t o  be achieved through design, operation, 
and control of th is  system (Figure 2 - 3 ) .  The primary "control s t rz te -  
g is t"  in the existing system was said t o  be the human operator who 
decided, fa r  example, when t o  pass, h o w  fas t  to travel , and how t o  
avoid hazards. 
A, subsequent 9SRI study for the Insurance Ins t i tu te  for  Highway 
Safety ( : I S )  described the Yighway Transportation System (HTS)  as 












Sour:?: Reference 9 




OPERATION-ALLY E V ~ X ~ P ! ~ E ? I T  CAPAB I L I TY TO 
DERIVED DESIGB OF 0PER.ATISG !,fEET OPERATIOSAL 





USE OF DESIGN 
CAPABILITIES 
Source: Reference 6 
a complex of four interacting subsys terns : drivers , vehicles, roads, 
and pedestrians ( 7 ) .  The phases were expanded from the precrash, 
crash, a n d  postcrash trichotomy of Haddon-Brenner t o  (1)  condition- 
ing (preparation for normal functioning), ( 2 )  t r a f f i c  (actual normal 
function of HTS elements], ( 3 )  accident in i t i a t ion ,  ( 4 )  col l is ion,  
and ( 5 )  post-accident. The HTS was then described i n  relation t o  
i t s  physical and social environment and t o  a "Highway Services 
System" which f a c i l i t a t e s  the use of  the highways in emergencies and 
for purposes other than nornal operations (Figure 2 -5 ) .  A concurrent 
study by the Stanford Research Ins t i tu te  (17) produced a somewhat 
similar b u t  less comprehensive a n d  rigorous framework for highway 
safety (Figure 2 - 6 ) .  
No fur ther  1 arge-scale conceptual i zing was documen ted i n  the 
1 i t e ra ture  until 1972, when a NHTSA-sponsored stlidy by Joscelyn and 
Jones presented a conceptual framework that  viewed the problem of 
highway safety from a new perspective (18, 19). I n  essence, the i r  
Z 
formulation envisioned highway safety as a closed-loop control 
process which attempts to maintain the negative outputs (cal led 
"d i su t i l i t y" )  of the HIS a t  some level that  will be tolerated by 
society (Figure 2 - 7 ) .  The framework treated the HTS in much the 
same way as ea r l i e r  constructs, b u t  added as areas of equal emphasis, 
(1) elemen t s  of society that  must be influenced t o  reduce crash 
losses, and ( 2 )  elements that  originate and apply measures t o  bring 
about loss reduction. Particular attention was given t o  the process 
by which crash risks to society were control 1 ed, and terminology 
(e .g. ,  "r isk management") drawn from the new discipline of systems 
safety analysis ( 2 0 )  and from the inslclrance industry ( 2 1 )  was used 
in describing that process. Later papers by Wilde ( 2 2 ,  23) applied 
the framework i n  analyzing individual driver behavior vis-a'-vis 
crashes. 
A t  present, there is  1 i t t l e  evidence t o  indicate that  any of 
the theories t h a t  3re based en systems approaches have Seen 'widely 
FIGURE 2-5 : HSRI C3NCEPTUAL FRAME1dORK 
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adopted for planning highway safety research on a global scale. The 
Joscelyn a n d  Jones model has been used in analyzing, designing, and 
supporting improvements t o  1 egal approaches t o  modifying driver 
behavior, b u t  has n o t  been widely applied t o  other areas of  highway 
safety. Other constructs described above have been used in develop- 
ing theories of crash causation and in developing data requirements 
for analyzing highway crashes. For the most par t ,  the public health 
approach expounded by tiaddon and associates has been accepted as 
the fundamental framework for analyzing highway safety problems and 
solutions. 
2 . 3  Summarv and Conclusions 
In highway safety,  theory i s  essential for organizing knowledge 
and bringing order into a very complex field.  Particularly important 
i s  the need t o  re late  knowledge about the nature of  highway crash 
losses. Theory i s  needed for determining in advance how t o  make the 
right decisions a b o u t  current responses to crash risks a n d  for  
directing inquiry t o  improve future responses. Theory i s  a7 so valuable 
for improving communications among individuals engaged in risk- 
reduction ac t iv i t ies  (e.g.  , researchers, l eg is la tors ,  pol ice o f f i ce r s ) .  
The history o f  highway safety indicates that  there has been l i t t l e  
e f fo r t  t o  create a comprehensive theory of highway safety t o  meet these 
needs and that promising theories have ei ther  n o t  been suff ic ient ly  
developed for universal application or have n o t  been widely accepted 
and applied. The l-taddon-8renner model, based on a public health 
approach, i s  currently the most commonly used theory or conceptua? 
framework. 
3.0 PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING T H E O R Y  
This chapter discusses the problems with existing theories 
from two perspectives. F i r s t ,  the conceptual 1 imitations of the 
theories are examined. We look to see i f  the descriptions are 
complete, i f  known relationships are  defined, and i f  an adequate 
explanation of how crashes are created and controlled i s  presented. 
The primary focus of this  examination i s  on the structure of the 
model , conceptual framework, or theory--not i t s  use. 
Second, the consequences of using existing theory are examined. 
As the Haddon-Brenner model has been used almost exclusively in 
the past ten years, i t  i s  the focus o f  this  discussion and c r i t i -  
cism. The discussion i s  negative because we are discussing problems 
and there are  problems that  reliance on the i r  model has created. 
Two points must be considered t o  place th i s  discussion i n  
perspective. F i rs t ,  the i r  model has contributed t o  the f ie ld  of 
highway safety.  Second, i t  f i t s  the requirements of a "good" 
theory in that  i t s  structure has provided for i t s  tes t ing,  i t s  
rejection and the development o f  new conceptual frameworks. 
3.1 Limitations of Existing Theory 
A review of the underlying principles of the conceptual frame- 
works and theories described in the 1 i terature  reveals two major 
deficiencies . 
a Existing theories concentrate on  events closely 
associated with t r a f f i c  crashes. 
r Existing theories Iaraely ignore interrslationships 
among factors that produce crashes, control forces 
that attenpt t o  reduce crashes and crash loss ,  and 
society as 3 whole. 
It i s  ~ l m o s t  m i o m c t i c  ~ k t  a o i u ~ i o n  o f  a  problem r e p i r e s  
t h a t  t h e  r a b i e m  >e u8equatziy d g 3 n a 2 .  Thus, =he  PAS of T O S ~  of 
t he  theor<es s n  the  trc;"f:c srash prgbZem is no t  i nheren t l y  trrovq. 
It i s  onZy when the  focus becsthes e zc ias ige  c r  30 FOTOW that o ther  
i m p o r t ~ n t  fcc tors  i n  nm~g ing  crash r4sk czrz e z c l d e d  j%rn zonsidzr-  
a t i o n  that the  csncep~uaL base c' t he  cheor<es weaken. h f o r t u m t e l ? ,  
t h i s  appears t o  be the  case w i t h  most o f  the  theor i e s  e z m i n e d .  
Th is  s i t u a t i o n  i s  somewhat paradox ica l ,  because t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  
i s  r e p l e t e  w i t h  d iscuss ions  o f  t he  importance o f  sys temat i c  con- 
s i d e r a t i o n  o f  a l l  i ssues ,  w i t h  emphasis p laced on t h e  i n c l u s i o n  o f  
" s o c i e t a l "  aspects o f  t h e  t r a f f i c  crashes and t h e i r  management. 
I n  1949 Gordon (72)  descr ibed  "socioeconomic" f a c t o r s  as compr is ing 
a  major com~onent  o f  t h e  environment i n  which t r a f f i c  crashes occur 
and "which come i n t o  p l a y  through a s s o c i a t i o n  o f  man w i t h  h i s  f e l l o w  
man." Said  Gordon: 
"Whatever t he  k i n d  o r  na tu re  o f  mass disease o r  i n j u r y ,  
t h e  p a r t  exe r t ed  by t h e  socioeconomic environment p robab ly  
i s  t he  most neg lec ted  o f  any ep idemio log ic  i n f l  uence, and 
acc iden ts  a r e  n o t  d i f f e r e n t  i n  t h i s  r espec t  f rom any o t h e r  
causes o f  damage.'" 
The importance o f  t h e  socioeconomic environment t o  s a f e t y  was r e -  
emphasized i n  1962 by McFarland and Moore ( 2 4 )  i n  another  paper on 
t he  ep idemio log ic  approach t o  acc iden ts .  
The iii 11 iamsburg Conference ( 3 )  was s u f f i c i e n t l y  concerned w i  t h  
t h e  s o c i e t a l  aspect of highway s a f e t y  t o  des ignate i t  as one o f  
t h r e e  major areas f o r  d i scuss ion  (a l ong  w i t h  t h e  systems approach 
and t h e  psychology of d r i v e r  behav io r ) .  The Conference recomnended 
t h a t  t he  p lace  of  t he  automobi le i n  American l i f e ,  highway d r i v i n g  as a 
s o c i a l  a c t i v i t y ,  and use o f  t h e  automobi les as an economic a c t i v i t y  
be major  t o p i c s  f o r  f u t u r e  research.  Wi th  r espec t  t o  the l a s t  t o p i c ,  
t he  conference observed t h a t :  
"An automobi le t r i p  by i t s  ve ry  l o g i c  tends t o  d i f f e r  f rom 
o r d i n a r y  economic good i n  severa l  respects- -e .  g . , t h e r e  a re  
numerous external economics and di seconomics ; consumer 
preferences interact  ; there i s  uncertainty , r i sk ,  and 
misperception of r i sk ;  there are other kinds of consumer 
ignorance. ' The usual market mechanism f a i l s  i n  t h i s  area 
t o  allocate the burden and t o  encourage the economizing 
of human 1 i f e ,  time, and money. Research should aim a t  
specifying an ideal solution and, once th is  i s  done, 
uncover the most profitable next steps p u b l  ic  and 
?r ivate  pol icy must take. The problem of the economics 
of t r a f f i c  safety i s  akin t o  the economics of public 
heal t h  and pub1 i c  goods i n  general ; for  instance, 
schools , courts, defense, e tc .  " 
I n  1967 Bonder ( 6 )  also recognized the need t o  include "social 
and legal factors" in a conceptual framework for  highway safety,  
b u t  assumed that  these factors would be of primary importance o n l y  
as they affected the behavior of the "vehicle controller" ( i . e . ,  
the dr iver)  . However, 3onder stated tha t :  
"Later models must include the effect  of social and legal 
factors on design character is t ics  of the vehicle and other 
subsystems and the i r  effect  on  various aspects of the 
operations model . " 
The HSRI conceptual framework of 1967 ( 7 )  also included a niche for  
the "social environment," which was described as "aspects of the 
organizational system of  society,  as a whole, which influence the 
HTS,"  Highway safety "research gaps" in the area of the social 
environment were said t o  include knowledge about the effects  of 
t r a f f i c  laws, pol ice enforcement, 1 egal sanctions, driver education, 
driving regulations, and publ  i c  information on the driver,  and 
knowledge about the impact of social structures and values on the 
driver.  
Despite these repeated expressions of concern for the societal 
aspects of t r a f f i c  crashes and highway safety programs, the theory 
)which appears t o  have dominated ac t iv i ty  within the f ie ld  for the 
l a s t  ten years f a i l s  t o  include these aspects expl ic i t ly .  We refer  
t 3  the ?ublic heaith approach that was articulated by 3addon and 
3renner in a n  expanded form. 
Their concept focuses on the crash problem. I t  i s  best suited 
for describing crash processes and for identifying targets for 
programs designed to control crash losses.  If taken a t  face value, 
th i s  theory imp1 ies that the crash problem as defined through 
application of the theory i s  something dealt  w i t h  by some unde- 
fined external group or forces. These undefined forces somehow 
will be stimulated ta the correct course of action once the nature 
of the problem i s  understood. The general domains of countermeasure 
design, implementation and evaluation are n o t  explicit ly treated by 
the theoretical framework. As i t  appears in the l i t e ra tu re ,  th i s  
theory i s  the archetypal example of  the second deficiency noted 
above. 
Several other problems also exis t  with the theory as it has 
been set  forth.  I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t ,  in retrospect, t o  ascertain from 
the l i te ra ture  whether these problems ar ise  from the underlying 
concepts o f  the theory or the way in which the concepts have been 
operatf onally stated or defined. 
The f i r s t  problem i s  the f i r s t  deficiency noted above. The 
conceptual framework narrow1 y focuses on  the crash problem. Nhi 1 e 
one may carry a causal chain t o  absurdity, i t  seems clear that many 
events not immediately associated with the crash sequence ( i  . e , ,  
pre-crash, a t  crash, and post-crash) influence crash causation and 
consequent loss.  The focus on the crash sequence, t o  the exclusion 
of more qeneral examination of HTS operations, often has as i t s  
consequence t o o  narrow closure. This results in loss of information 
important for risk reduction. For example, direct application of 
the theory would lead us t o  examine \why people drove badly i n  s i  t u -  
ations that resui t t d  i n  crashes b u t  not ~ h y  people drove we1 1 and 
avoided crashes. Our point i s  that the emphasis is  o n  the problen 
t o  the exclusion of  orher inforrnat'on that nay omvide insights t o  
the solution. 
A second problem with the theory has i t s  genesis in the way 
the theory i s  graphically presented. The precise three by three 
matrix with each cell  the same size conveys the impression of 
equality among the c e l l s .  I n  rea l i ty  th is  i s  not so. Apparently 
one must assume that  people not involved i n  crashes and operating 
within the HTS are i n  a pre-crash s t a t e ,  post-crash s t a t e ,  or both. 
Given the relat ively large number of  people n o t  involved in crashes 
compared t o  those who are ,  one must e i ther  conceive of the pre-crash 
and post-crash elements of the matrix as inordinately large in 
comparison t o  the at-crash elements (see Figure 3-1 ) o r ,  dl ternatively,  
think of the HTS as containing a series of Haddon-Brenner matrices 
w i t h  drivers transitioning among them as a function of time (see 
Figure 3 - 2 ) .  Regardless of the construct, the problem i s  that  the 
cell  s are not equal . One has much more time t o  imp1 ement preventive 
countermeasures i n  the pre-crash phase than in the at-crash or 
immediate post-crash phases. 
The conceptual framework, as graphical ly presented, simp1 i f i e s  
a very complex problem. The focus i s  on  the crash and leads t o  
the suggestion of countermeasures that equally focus o n  the crash. 
This i s  an errctr only to the extent that  such a focus precludes 
other avenues of inquiry that  might have greater effectiveness. 
One i s  reminded of the parable o f  the drunk and the 1 amppost. Even 
though the dime was los t  i n  the alley the drunk preferred to  look 
for i t  near the s t ree t '  lamp, where there was 1 ight .  The primary 
impact of the Haddon-Brenner theory i s  t o  shine a briaht l igh t  
on one aspect of highway safety.  
3ne can speculate on why this  theory has been so widely accepted. 
The 1 i rerature,  i n  b o t h  theoretical discuss'ons and  operational 
appi icat i  ons , has zsed this  conceptual framework almost t o  the excl u -  
sion o f  others. Those :\rho follcw the personal it;/ theory of ool 'cy 
a n a l y s i s  nay goint to Y e  =act that  Dr. !!addon, a f te r  a sian'fican; 
/ '  
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career as a researcher, became the f i r s t  director o f  NHSB, 
where he was joined by Robert Brenner. The Haddon-Brenner model 
was frequently referenced i n  public presentations a n d  could be 
viewed by observors as reflecting NHSB doctrine. I t  i s  probable 
that  the position of Haddon and Brenner and the exposure the 
concept received promoted i t s  widespread adoption. However, th i s  
was probably n o t  the overriding reason for  i t s  acceptance. The 
theory was presented a t  a time when society generally perceived 
t r a f f i c  crashes as a problem. Thus, a problem-oriented theory f i t  
the mood o f  a society that was in a hurry t o  move forward with 
action programs. The theory also was comfortable for widespread 
elements of the highway safety cormnunity. Illany of these jndivid- 
uals grew up w i t h  fa i th  in the three i t s  (education, engineering, 
and enforcement) as the cure for  t r a f f i c  crashes. The Haddon- 
Brenner theory was compati b l  e with these concepts a n d  provided a 
convenient and more rigorous method of target selection. ( I n  
fac t ,  one can simply expand the model by i l lus t ra t ing  th is  target 
concept (see Figure 3 - 3 ) )  . 
The theory was also expressed in familiar terms. I t  did n o t  
use the jargon of the "systems approach ," nor were complex i l l  - 
defined re1 ationships postulated and expressed in almost incompre- 
hensible diagrams. I t  a1 lowed conventional wisdom t o  proceed. I n  
particular,  i t  allowed free reign t o  those who be1 ieved that the 
t r a f f i c  safety problem could be solved by more resources doing 
more of the same thing. Unfortunately, the theory did not provide 
expl ici t ly  for measurement of ,effectiveness, so that  even though 
more was done the effect  is  1 argely unknown .  
I n  a sense, the major limitation of this  theory i s  that  i: 
is  too simple. I t  provides too broad brush a treatment that 's  nor 
sensirive t o  changes within society or interrelationships among 
elements o f  the highway transportation system. As noted previously, 
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operationally expressed or defined as from the way in which the 
concept was originally conceived. I t  i s  c lear  that  b o t h  Drs. Hzddon 
and Brenner are sc ien t i s t s  w i t h  a much broader view of society and 
highway safety than may be seen from their  expression of th is  con- 
ceptual framework. I t  must also be remembered that the framework 
has been used operational ly by thousands of. individuai s who have 
had no communication with the authors of the concept and do n o t  
have their  background and experience in researcR or highway safety. 
3 . 2  Consequences of Existing Theory 
As discussed in the previous section, the macro-theory that  has 
dominated policymaking for research and action programs in highway 
safety has been the Haddon-8renner model. Several consequences of 
following this  general theory appear t o  conflict  with both logic and 
recommendations t h a t  appear i n  the highway safety 1 i terature .  
The most general impact of following the theory has been t o  
focus research and subsequent actions narrowly on the crash process 
and events that closely precede or follow the crash i n  time. Thus, 
one finds research describing the dynamics of crashes with s igni f i -  
cant emphasis o n  the at-crash phase and action programs concentrated 
on  minimizing loss a f t e r  crashes rather than preventing crashes. 
More limited examinations of pre-crash events ( i n  the sense of 
t r a f f i c  crash causation) and post-crash events have been undertaken. 
I n  contrast ,  research on the general driving task has been 
1 imi ted. Perhaps more cr i t ica l  , research examining the compi ex 
re1 ationshi ps that create and support man agemen t sys tems in tended 
t o  reduce crashes i s  extremely 1 ini ted. Examination of traditional 
services such as enforcement, adj udicat'on , a n d  emergency medical 
services has been gndertaken, b u t  i n  h i s h l  y traditional contexts. 
The research has, in general, not qustioned standing goals b u t  has 
ioctlsed o n  improvina cne ef=iciency of service del ivery . 
Action programs have a1 so been narrowly developed. I n  general, 
they have tended t o  ref lect  extensions of pre-existing concepts 
( pre-1 965) . Control force relationships are presumed t o  ex is t .  
Emphasis has been placed on increased levels of e f for t  and better 
management of service de1 i very, as opposed t o  questioning basic 
assumptions of e i ther  objectives or service delivery methods. 
This does not suggest that  a1 1 approaches tha t  have been 
followed are wrong. What i s  suggested i s  that  alternatives have 
n o t  been explored adequately and the approaches followed have not 
been rigorous? y eval uated. 
The research and action program record also ref lects  a strong 
tendency t o  concentrate on e f for t s  expected t o  have an immediate 
impact on t r a f f i c  crashes. There has been a tendency t o  look for  
solutions in the " l ight , "  as did the drunk looking for the los t  
dime. This may stem more from the basic human drives of pol icymakers, 
who seek t o  make a n  impact that  can be realized during the i r  tenure 
in off ice,  than from careful application of sound highway safety 
theory. Theory should direct  pol icyrnaking toward effective research 
and action programs. I t  should establ ish the unreasonableness of 
programs that are  n o t  well founded. The narrowness of the Haddon- 
Brenner theory has not provided th is  important function for  policy- 
makers . 
I t  has been easier to focus on technological solutions ( e .g . ,  
engineering changes) with ernphasi s on the vehicle and the highway 
rather than the driver.  Unfortunately once th is  trend s t a r t s  i t  
i s  d i f f i cu l t  to  a1 t e r .  The body of knowledge increases in areas 
that are the focus of j t u d y .  New research areas are suggested a n d  
new programs started i n  those areas. Areas ignored do not advance. 
I n  f a c t ,  in comparative terns they recede. This i s  largely the 
case today w i t h  research and programs focused cn the human factor.  
T h i s  human factor appears in a narrow sense f n  the form o f  individ- 
ual driver behaviors and in  3 broader form i n  the soci2t31 and 
insti tutional responses t o  t r a f f i c  crash r i sk .  Rigorous, large-scale 
research programs examining these complex issues in a comprehensive 
structure do n o t  ex is t .  Action programs dealing with the human 
factor re f lec t  a collage of conventional s t rategies  focused on 
current targets o f  in te res t .  
This lack of balance flows from the lack of  an underlying body 
of theory that  can frame the area o f  highway safgty, describe the 
dimensions o f  the process, and establish a body of rules for  decision- 
making. 
I t  i s  b o t h  interesting and informative t o  re f lec t  on  the safety 
impact of the energy c r i s i s ,  which produced reduced driving and 
lower travel speeds. The reduction i n  fa tal  i t i  es i s  dramatic evidence 
of the "human" factor.  I n  contrast ,  technology has prcvided the 
lap-torso res t ra in t ,  which has significant potential for injury 
reduction. Yet, i t ' i s  n o t  used by a larse  portion of the population. 
Our research does not t e l l  us why th i s  i s  or suggest hcw i t  may be 
changed. The solution of passive res t ra in ts ,  an example of looking 
in the l igh t ,  bypasses basic concerns about the role o f  the human 
factor.  
g 
Existing highway saf2ty theory concentrates o n  t r a f f i c  crashes. 
This narrow focus i s  a major l imitation. Factors that  manage the 
crash risk are ei ther  excluded or inadequately treated. The roles 
of society in creating t r a f f i c  crashes and reducing crash loses 
are  1 argel y i gnored . 
The most widely used theory, the Haddon-arenner model , i s  useful 
for describing crash processes and for identifying tarcjets for risk 
management action, b u t  i s  inadequate for deal ing with the intsractions 
between tne 1 oss-generating elements of the Highway Transqortation 
System and the elements o f  society that wish t o  reduce those losses.  
Specifically,  forces that  provide motivation for individual or group 
action t o  create or reduce crash losses are n o t  treated expl ici t ly  
by th i s  theory. This has resul ted i n  the removal of many fundamental 
areas of  concern from the mainstream of highway safety research and 
action. Clearly, a more comprehensive theory i s  needed t o  re la te  
the elements of society that generate and are affected by crash 
losses. 

4.0 A NEg CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY 
This  chap te r  p resen ts  a new d e s c r i p t i v e  t heo ry  o f  highway sa fe ty .  
The theory  i s  presented i n  t h e  form of a conceptua l  framework d e s c r i b i n g  
t h e  highway s a f e t y  process. The framework develops t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
between s o c i e t a l  o b j e c t i v e s  f o r  s a f e t y  i n  highway t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  and 
f u n c t i o n a l  means o f  ach iev i ng  those o b j e c t i v e s .  
In preced ing  chapters  we d i d  n o t  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  between t h e  terms 
theory ,  conceptua l  framework, and model. Ne use t he  term conceptua l  
framework t o  desc r i be  t h e  new " t heo ry "  because i t  i s  n o t  presented i n  
s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l  t o  wa r ran t  i t s  be ing  c a l l e d  a model. The conceptua l  
framework i s  u s e f u l  f o r  unders tanding t he  highway s a f e t y  process. I t  
i s  a s tep  toward formal  theory .  We urge i t s  examinat ion i n  t h a t  con tex t .  
The conceptual  framework has t h r e e  bas i c  elements : 
a The Highway T ranspo r t a t i on  System; 
a Soc ie ty ;  and 
a R i  s  k Management Sys terns. 
The highway s a f e t y  process e n t a i l s  i n t e r a c t i o n s  among those 
elements f o r  purposes o f  reduc ing  crashes and c rash  losses .  
The f o l l o w i n g  sec t i ons  d e f i n e  t h e  elements, t h e i r  i n t e r r e l a t f  on- 
sh ips,  and fundamental c o n s t r a i n t s  on t h e  highway sa fe ty  process. 
4.1 The Highway T r a n s p o r t a t i o n  System 
The f i r s t  element o f  o u r  conceptual  framework i s  t h e  Fighway 
T ranspo r t a t i on  Sys tern (HTS) . We d e f i  ne t he  system t o  i nc1 ude t h e  
highway n e t ~ o r k ,  veh i c l es ,  sys tem users ,  and suppo r t i ng  components. 
Th is  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t ne  HTS i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  same used i n  severa i  
o t he r  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i scuss ions  of highway s a f e t y  ( 5 ,  7 ,  17,  13, 1 9 ) .  
Figure 4-1 depicts the HTS. (This i 11  ustration and similar i l lus t ra t ions  
of otherelements are l a t e r  combined i n  a graphic reprzsentation of the 
conceptual framework--the highway safety process. ) 
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The primary objectives of the HTS are t o  provide mobility with 
safety.  Many secondary objectives a1 so ex is t ,  such as providing recrea- 
tion and pleasure for system users, providing a market for the automobile 
transportation industry, and supporting the national economy. The 
top-level functions of the HIS nlay be described as the design, construction, 
operation, and support of the system as a whole and of i t s  constituent 
parts. In  th i s  sense, the system i s  defined in a broader context than 
in some prior theoretical frameworks. 
The HTS was created and has grown in our society because i t  
provides benefits for society in the course of performing i t s  four 
top-level functions. The term "uti 1 i ty" describes a1 1 positive outputs 
of the HTS. These include individual mobility, rapid transportation of 
goods, and the social economic we1 1 -being that flows from the HTS opera- 
tions. The HTS operations also produce negative outputs in the form 
of t r a f f i c  crashes w i t h  associated deaths, injur ies ,  and property 
1 osses. Other negative outputs include environmental degredati on and 
depletion of natural resources. The t e n  "di suti  1 i ty"  i s  used t o  
describe these negative outputs. * 
*Some d i  scipl ines consider 'uti l  i t y "  as a term having b o t h  positive 
and  negative values. In this  sense, disut i l  i t y  i s  ecuated ,d izh  
negative u t i l i t y .  
Figure 4-2 i l l u s t r a t e s  the HTS and i t s  outputs. 
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The concept of disut i l  i t y  may be operationally defined ' in a 
number of ways. In th is  discussion, we describe i t  as the negative 
o u t p u t  associated with a particular event ( i  . e . ,  a t r a f f i c  crash) .  
Thus, from a highway safety perspective, we may describe t r a f f i c  crash 
losses as d isu t i l  i t i e s .  Society i s  concerned w i t h  minimizing the 
occurrence of events that  produce d isu t i l  i t y ,  - and, i f  they occur, with 
minimizing the loss. This perspective requires that we think of future 
action about future events. We use the term r isk t o  aid in thinking 
about future events that  will produce loss.  More expl ic i t ly ,  we 
define r isk as a probability. 
Risk i s  the probability of the occurrence of an 
event that will produce d i s u t i l i t y .  
I n  the simplest highway safety context we could speak of the 
r isk of a crash that would have associated with i t  some specific loss.  
Actually, we are  concerned with a ser ies  of r isks:  the risk of a crash 
of a vehicle, the r isk of an occupant impacting on the in te r ior  of the 
vehicle, the risk of additional loss because an injury does not receive 
prompt at tent ion,  e tc .  
The concepts of r isk and  d i s u t i l i t y  areimportant because they 
form the basis for societal concerns that lead t o  societal action. 
4 . 2  Society 
We ident i fy  society as the second major element within our 
conceptual framework. Society i s  broadly defined to  include a11 in- 
dividuals and i n s t i t u t i ons ,  both public and private,  tha t  have a ro le  
in making decisions about the operations of the Highway Transportaticn 
System. These decisions may be individual choices of a system user 
( e . g . ,  a d r i ve r ) ,  public policy enacted by a l eg i s l a t i ve  body, or  
decisions of other part icipants in the system. Society observes the 
operations of the HTS and the u t i l i t y  and disut i  1 i ty generated. This 
i s  i l l u s t r a t ed  in Figure 4-3. 
1 Society I 
If  the magnitude of the disdt i  1 i t y  i s  large enough compared to  
the u t i l i t y  t o  evoke socie ta l  concern, formal act ions a re  taken in an 
attempt t o  reduce the r isk  tha t  creates the d i su t i l  i t y .  These r i sk -  
reduction actions a re  safety actions.  In t h i s  context, i t  i s  useful 
t o  t h i n k  of society as representing the market fo r  highway safe ty .  
In our e a r l i e r  ~ o r k  o n  the T r a f f i c  Law System (18, 1 9 )  we 
suggested the concept of a level of d i s u t i l i t y  tha t  would produce 
formal p u b ?  i c  Pesoonses. Ye defined t h i s  level as the naxinum to l e r -  
able d isut i  l i z y .  Disuti l i  t y  ' n  excess of this level produces societal  
pressure f o r  ~ignway safety ac t i v i t y .  As disut i  1 i ty  increases above 
thi s maximum ~ o l  era312 lwei the pressuro for nighway safe ty  action 
increases. Conversely, as the level of d i su t i l i  ty drops below the 
maximum tolerable level ,  societal concern decreases and support for  
highway safety a1 so decreases. 
When di suti  1 i ty i s  in excess of the maximum tolerable 1 evel , 
society creates and supports systems t o  reduce the r isk.  We call  
these en t i  t i e s  r i  s k-management sys tems. 
4 .3  Risk- Management Systems 
The risk-management systems form the third element of our concep- 
tual framework. These systems are formal and informal structures 
created by society t o  exert control forces on  the Highway Transportation 
System t o  reduce r isk.  This i s  i l lus t ra ted  in Figure 4-4. (This 
i 11 ustration presents our conceptual framework in i t s  most basic form. ) 
The risk-management systems actually do n o t  seek t o  eliminate r i sk ,  
a1 though they my purport t o .  They operate t o  reduce r isk t o  a 1 evel 
less than or equal t o  the maximum tolerable d i su t i l i  ty . 
These risk-management systems are  very numerous and not we1 1 
defined. They include formal systems (e .g . ,  the Traffic Law System), 
parts of formal systems focused o n  broader aspects of society ( e .g . ,  
the health care delivery systems), and 1 ess formalized systems (e .g . ,  
the media used for public infonat ion  and education). Many societal 
influences (e.g. ,  customs, e thics ,  mores, folkways, family s t ructures ,  
peer pressures, e t c . )  also exert control forces that have not  been 
systematically defined. In f ac t ,  significant components of the risk- 
manaaement element of the cmceptual framework have not been formally 
defined or their  effect established. There a re ,  however, many 
references t o  the i r  existence throughout the l i t e ra tu re  of highway 
safety and the nore general l i t e ra ture  on management o f  societal 
r isks ( e . g . ,  crime, p u b 1  ic  heal tb ,  defense, e x . )  . 
Viewed i n  a broad perspective, tne conceptual framework regre- 
sents a process. The o b j e c r  o f  the arocoss i s  ro contrgl d i su t i l i t y  
in a specific societal s y s t m ,  i n  t h i s  case tne Highway Transaortation 
Systev. The nicjhway safety wocess i s  a d i  s u ~ 4 l  i ty-control ~ r o c 2 s s .  
SOCIETY 
I t  can be thought of as one of several d i s u t i l i t y  control processes 
tha t  ac t  t o  reduce societal r isks in the broadest sense. These processes 
compete for  soc ie ty ' s  resources to carry o u t  control a c t i v i t i e s .  
An analogy can be made between the highway safety process and 
closed-loop control systems used t o  regulate physical systems. In both 
cases, the objective i s  t o  maintain the o u t p u t  of the regulated system 
w i t h i n  specified tolerances o r ,  stated in another way, t o  reduce the 
difference between the desired o u t p u t  and the actual output ( i . e . ,  the 
system er ror )  t o  zero. Signals that  measure the system error  are sent 
t o  a control system that  generates control forces that  are  applied t o  
the prime system t o  reduce the error .  The control forces increase in 
magnitude as the magnitude of system error increases. Continuous measure- 
ment of error  and the control forces provides information for  adjusting 
the strength of the control forces t o  reduce the error .  I n  physical 
systems, the continuous monitoring and adjustment eventual l y  reduce the 
e r ro r  t o  some insignificant amount near zero and the system i s  said t o  
be in equilibrium, 
In the Highway Safety Process (HSP), society serves as the monitoring 
device, measuring both the system er ror  and the strength of the control 
forces. The error  i s  the excess of  d i s u t i l i t y  over u t i l i t y .  In th i s  
sense, our term maximum tolerable d i s u t i l i t y  must be t h o u g h t  of as a 
net term reflecting the outcome of the societal  balancing of u t i l i t y  -
and d isu t i l  i  ty generated by HTS oeprations. The strength of the control 
forces i s  a function of the operations of the risk-management systems. 
Society in monitoring these operations a1 so balances the positive and 
negative benefits. Society will not to le ra te  a risk-management ac t iv i ty  
that  produces more negative benefits than positive. The cure tha t  i s  
worse than the i l  lness'wi 11 not be tolerated.  The monitoring f ~ n c t i o n  
i s  shown on an expanded version of the basic conceptual framework 
(see Figure 4-5) by arrows indicating the infornation flow paths. The 
information i s  used t o  make decisions a b o u t  r isk and risk rnanacernent. 
Thus, the crucial role that  society plays w i t h i n  the hignway 
safety 7rocoss can be seen as a fundamental limitation of the process. 
UTILITY 
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This fundamental limitation has i t s  foundation in two basic contraints:  
(1  ) perception of risk a n d  r i  sk-management operations; ( 2 )  i nformation 
on risk and risk-management operations. These constraints are inter-  
related; perception i s  a function of information, b u t  i t  also has quite 
independent a t t r i  butes. These constraints are di scussed in the fo l l  owing 
section. 
4 . 4  Fundamental Constraints on  the Highway Safety Process 
In the preceding section the role that  society plays in monitoring 
net d i s u t i l i t y  and control force strengths was noted. The discussion 
was in absolute terms, as i f  the actual values of d i s u t i l i t y  and the 
control forces were known and used by society in decision-flaking. I t  
i s  evident that the actual values of d i s u t i l i t y  and the nature and 
effects of the r isk management operations are  not known. This information 
i s  not available today in the quantity or quality necessary t o  support 
informed decision-maki ng. The lack of information does n o t  i nval i date 
the conceptual framework. 
The highway safety process can operate optimally only i f  perfect 
risk-management informa tion i s  communicated t o  each of i t s  elements and 
components. Perfect risk-management information i s  complete and accurate 
information on ( 1  ) the s t ructure,  components, functions, inputs, and 
outputs of the highway safety process, and ( 2 )  the factors and processes 
that  govern decision-making within the highway safety process. The 
term communicated, in the sense the word i s  used above, i s  a concept 
that  implies not only accurate transmission b u t  also accurate reception 
of the required information. We emphasize that  accurate reception must 
i ncl ude accurate unders tandi ng . 
I t  i s  this  l a s t  element, understanding, that  forms a major portion 
of another fundamental constraint on the highway safety process-societal 
perceptions. Even i f  cmplete  and accurate information were avai lab1 e ,  
society would continue t o  be guided by i t s  understanding or perception 
of risk and risk-management ac t iv i t i e s  in making decisions about the 
highway safe ty  process. Thus, society ac t s  on the basis of 9erceived 
d i su t i l  i t y ,  perceived r i s k ,  perceived benefi ts  and disbenefi t s  of r i sk  
management, ra ther  than on  the basis of actual values. The socie ta l  
perceptions a re  formed as a r e su l t  of a complex shaping of individual 
perceptions. The perception formation process i s  i 11 -defined and i 11 - 
understood. Avai 1 able evidence suggests t ha t  a perception gap ex i s t s  
(18, 2 5 ,  2 7 ) .  Perceived r i sk  appears t o  be lower than actual r i s k ,  
b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  c l ea r ly  established.  I t  i s  c lea r  t ha t  perceptions c f  
r i sk  and of the value of risk-management action govern the highway 
safety process. Thus, i n  a theoretical  sense of optimizing the process, 
one would seek t o  reduce the perception gap to zero so t h a t  perceived 
r i sk  equalled actual r i sk .  
In the real ~ o r l d  one cannot r e a l i s t i c a l l y  expect t o  reduce 
the perception gap t o  zero. F i r s t ,  i t  i s  doubtful t ha t  information will 
ever be available in su f f i c ien t  deta i l  to  accurately es tabl ish  actual 
r i sk  in every case. 
Second, the process of r i sk  perception i s  highly complex and 
varies greatly from individual to individual. When we speak of perceived 
r i sk  or maximum tolerable  d i s u t i l i t y  we speak of individual values 
combined in a societal  posit ion.  A t  any point in time those.  individual 
values represent a d i s t r ibu t ion ,  or many d i s t r ibu t ions ,  fndividuals 
vary not only in how they perceive r i sk  b u t  in how much r i sk  i s  acceptable. 
Risk i s  not a s ingle  item i n  t h i s  context b u t  many. Individuals a r e  
l ike ly  to hold qui te  d i f fe ren t  perceptions about d i f fe ren t  r i sks  and 
!?hat ouqht to  be done about them. 
Third, a l l  the perceptions change w i t h  time. The perception o f  
r i sk  i s  a dynamic and not a s t a t i c  process. These changing perceptions 
a f f ec t  societal  acceptance of r i sk  nanagement pract ices .  
The objective,  then, i s  t o  a t t enp t  to  narrow percoption gaps as 
much as possible. 
I f  perception gaps ?Mere narrowed, sociery a s  3 ~ a r k e t  forts 
would appropriate1 y determine the level cf safety desired.  A naximurn 
to lerable  d i s u t i l  i t y  (ne t  d i su t i  1 i t y )  with a corresponding r i sk  value 
could be established.  In turn, the nature and extent  of risk-manage- 
ment operations required t o  reach t ha t  r i sk  level could be defined. 
Safety measures beyond t ha t  point would not be supported. In f a c t ,  
personal risk-taking might increase the level of r i sk  to  the to le rab le  
level i f  i t  were a r t i f i c i a l l y  depressed. This concept has been suggested 
by Wilde (22 ,  23) as i t  r e l a t e s  t o  individual r i sk  behaviors and by 
Pel tzman (34)  in a broader socie ta l  context .  Pel tzman in e f f ec t  argues 
t h a t ,  current ly ,  the level of r i sk  i s  equal t o  t ha t  which i s  to le rab le ,  
and t ha t  t h i s  explains the lack of success of recent  e f f o r t s  t o  reduce 
HTS r i sk .  The mathematical methods Peltzman used t o  support t h i s  . 
hypothesis have been severely c r i t i c i z e d  ( 3 5 ) .  Some data tend t o  support 
h is  hypothesis t ha t  r i sk  equilibrium has been reached. For example, 
one indicator  of HTS r i s k ,  f a t a l  crashes per 100,000 of population, has 
remained a t  a f a i r l y  constant  level f o r  the past  f i f t y  years (see  
Figure 4-5).  
While his hypothesis may be supported, i t s  basic va l i d i t y  r e s t s  
on the accuracy of socie ta l  perception of r i sk .  I f  the present per- 
ception of r i sk  i s  lower than the actual r i sk  and can be a l t e red  to  a 
value nearer to  the actual value, i t  would follow, from our conceptual 
framework, t ha t  socie ty  would support increased control act ion and 
engage i n  personal r i sk  avoidance unt i l  an equilibrium s t a t e  w i t h  lower 
d i s u t i l i t y  was reached consis tent  w i t h  the new perception of r i sk .  
Thus, the importance of socie ta l  perceptions of r i sk  and r i s k  
management can be seen. These perceptions forn fundamental const ra ints  
on the highway safety process. 
Despite the ease in s t a t i ng  t h i s  proposit ion,  the concept i s  
d i f f i c u l t  to  adopt in p rac t i ce ,  i f  we can accepr the va l id i ty  of 
past experience. Societal perceptions were e i t he r  ignored o r  mis-read 
in the development and promulgation of regulat ions requiring the 
seatbel t - igni  t ion interlock system ( 2 8 ) .  As a resul t ,  Congress, pre- 
sumably re f lec t ing  the public 7erception o f  the negative value of t h i s  
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4 .  The highway safe ty  process i s  limited by the quanti ty and 
qua1 i ty  of information avai lable  f o r  decision-making and 
the perceptions of socie ty  about - ri s k and ' r i  sk-managemen t 
system operations.  
5 .  - Risk i s  the probabil i ty of occurrence of an event ( e . g . ,  
a t r a f f i c  crash)  t ha t  wil l  produce d i s u t i l  i ty  ( e . g . ,  
death, in jury ,  property l o s s ,  e t c  . )  . 
6.  Ri sk-Manaqement Systems a r e  formal and informal mechani sms 
created by socie ty  t o  exer t  control forces o n  the HTS to  
reduce d i  s u t i  1 i ty to  a to1 erabl e 1 eve1 . 
7. Soc ie ty ' s  demand f o r  and support of r i  sk-management a c t i v i  - 
t i e s  increases as ( 1 )  the perception of magnitude of r i sk  
increases ( i . e . ,  perception of the excess of d i s u t i l i t y  
above the to le rab le  level ) and ( 2 )  the perception of the 
net  benef i ts  of risk-management operations increases.  
8. Society wil l  not demand or support risk-management system 
action i f  the Highway Transportation System i s  perceived 
t o  be in equilibrium ( i  , e n ,  perceived net  d i s u t i l i t y  i s  
l e s s  than or equal to  maximum to le rab le  d i s u t i l i t y ) .  
4 . 6  Sumrrdry and Concl us i ons 
A conceptual framework t ha t  describes the highway sa fe ty  process 
as  one of soc i e ty ' s  d i  s u t i l  i t y  control processes has been introduced. 
The framework incl udes three major elements : the Highway Transportation 
System, Society, and' the Risk-Management Systems. The risk-management 
systems generate control forces  t o  reduce r i s k  w i t h i n  the Highway 
Transportation System. The nature and extent  of control forces depends 
upon  soc i e ty ' s  perceptions of (1  1 risks and associated net  d i s u t i l  i t i e s  
and (21 net benefi ts  of the risk-management ac t ions .  Society wii 1 support 
risk-management ac t ions  i f  r i sk  exceeds a level society views as 
to le rab le ,  and i f  society be1 ieves the control act ions of the r i sk -  
management sys tems a r e  appropriate.  Society decides how much sa fe ty  
i s  enough by balancing these equ i t i e s .  The balancing is c r i t i c a l l y  
dependent upon the qua l i ty  and quanti ty o f  infornation t h a t  describes 
r i sk s  and operations o f  the risk-management syst2ms. The way i n  wnich 
society forms p e r c e ~ t i o n s  from this  infomat ion i s  a lso  c r i t i c a l ,  
because i t  i s  the perceptions ra ther  than f a c t s  ?hat govern socie ta l  

5.0  THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING HOW 
PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT RISK 
The development of the conceptual framework i n  the preceding 
chapter h i g h 1  ighted the c r i t i ca l  role that  individual a n d  group 
decisions play in the highway safety process. The decisions 
individuals make determine the magnitude of the risk of  t r a f f i c  
crashes. The decisions groups make determine how effectively 
the t r a f f i c  crash risk i s  managed. 
These decisions basically deal with risk and risk management. 
A decision may be t o  take a r i sk ,  to avoid a r i sk ,  or t o  ignore the 
whole issue. Risk-taking, risk-avoidance, and inaction a11 flow 
from individual and group understandings and  perceptions. 
If we are t o  reduce t r a f f i c  crash losses,  we must under- 
stand how these decisions are made by individual system users, 
policymakers, risk managers, and society as a whole. 
In  the same sensz that we need general theory t o  structure 
and guide the highway safety process, we need theory that explains 
how decisions within that process are made. 
This chapter briefly reviews de'cision-making theory. I t  
presents major theories and explanations that  are useful in under- 
standing risk and risk-management decisions. 
5 .1  History of Decision-Making Theory 
A variety o f  theories a n d  models extant in the social science 
1 i terature szek t o  e x ~ l a i n  the jurposive, qlanned, or conscious 
behavior o f  individuals and groups. Such theories artempt TO explain 
and 7redict such behavior. Perflaps the best know o f  the theories o f  
planned or purposive behavior i s  found in the empirical and 
theoretical  1 i t e r a t ~ r e  in the area known as de~ is ion~making .  
Decision theory has i t s  or ig ins  in the branch of mathematics 
known as probabi 1 i ty  theory. Questions posed in a deci s i  on-theory 
context stimulated advances in the mathematics of probabil i ty  theory. 
So closely a re  these two f i e l d s  a l l i e d  t ha t  one can regard decision- 
theory as a branch of applied probabi 1 i ty theory. 
5.1.1 Expected Value Theory. The f i r s t  theory of decision- 
making was based on  the concept of expected values. The theory origin- 
ated t o  f a c i l i t a t e  be t t e r  decisions about gambling. I t  s t a t e s ,  in 
e f f ec t ,  t h a t  a gambler faced with a decision about how t o  make bets 
on uncertain events with d i f f e r en t  payoffs. should bet  on the event 
t ha t ,  on the average, maximizes his winnings. The sxpected value model 
may be formally specif ied as follows: a decision-maker must s e l ec t  
one a l t e rna t ive  course of action out of  a s e t  of a l t e rna t ives .  
Through some independent random process, a " s t a t e  of the world" i s  
determined or selected from a s2 t  of a11 possible s t a t e s .  The se lect ion 
by the decision-maker of an a1 t e rna t ive ,  and the occurrence, by random 
process, of a par t icular  s t a t e  of the world deternines an "outcome" 
which can be represented as a monetary payoff (o r  loss )  t o  the decision- 
maker. Further, it i s  assumed t ha t  the decision-maker knows the 
probabi l i t ies  w i t h  which each of the possible s t a t e s  of the world can 
occur, knows the monetary values associated wi tn each possible outccxne, 
and knows the se t s  of possible courses of action and possible s t a t e s  
of the world. The expected value model of decision-making s t a t e s  t ha t  
the "ra t ional"  decision-maker wil l  make his choice by computing the 
"expected value" o r  average return of each a1 ternat ive  avai lable  t o  
him, and then s e l ec t  tha t  a l t e rna t ive  whose expected value i s  l a rges t .  
This maximizing of expected value i s  referred t o  in decision theory 
as a s t ra tegy.  
T'ni s model of "rat ional  " decision-maki ng , del~eioped ~rri thin the 
cgntext of gambling choices, was soon prcpcsed as a theciry o f  human 
decisi on-making. Under the prevai 1 ing be1 ief tha t  humans were essen- 
t i a l  l y  guided by reason and rational i t y  , the normative expected val ue 
decision model was proposed, and for a time accepted by some, as a 
descriptive model of human deci sion-making. 
As with other models and theories of human behavior, i t  was 
not long before experimental investigations indicated tha t  human 
decision-makers did not in fac t  comply with the predictions of behavior 
generated by the expected value model. For example, instances could 
be constructed in which most persons would prefer certain choices 
with lower expected value over those with higher expected value. Thus, 
i t  was evident tha t  human deci s i  on-makers were responding t o  aspects 
and dimensions of deci sion-making s i tuat ions that  went beyond the 
mere computation of probabi 1 i t i  es and monetary payoffs. 
As i s  often the case i n  the history of sc i en t i f i c  investiga- 
tions and theory building, experimental evidence which contradicts 
the prevailing theory of the day resulted in modifications o f  the theory 
so as t o  accommodate the new data, rather than outright rejection of 
the theory. !!!hat typical ly occurs when data challenges theory i s  an 
elaboration of the theory--the addition, fo r  example, of more free 
parameters, the construction of more "special cases ," or the specifica- 
t i o n  of limiting conditions which circumscribe the domain of the theory, 
so that  data incornpati ble with i t  are  held not t o  be relevant. 'rlhen 
a theory i s  popularly held i t  can prove t o  be surprisingly resis tant  
t o  contradicting experimental resu l t s .  Often a sc i en t i f i c  theory i s  
rejected only when i t  has become so elaborated with "special cases" 
and conceptual elaborations that  i t  col lapses under i t ;  own in t e l l  ectual 
weight. A classical example of th is  i s  found in the case of the 
Ptolemaic theory of the solar  system, which fixed the earth a t  the 
center of the universe and had the various s t a r s  and planets orbiting 
around i t  a t  various speeds and distances. With the growing accu~u la -  
t i  on of astronomical observations, ever more elaborate ce les t ia l  
patterns of orbi ta l  novement had t o  be devised t o  maintain the geocentric 
assumption of the theory. Only when the theoretical  o rb i t s  of move- 
ment bordered upon the preposterous did the Ptolemaic theory yie ld  
to the f a r  simpler and conceptual 1y more economical he1 iocentr ic  
Copernican theory. When one traces the history o f  theory and 
model 1 ing in the area of decision-making, a simi 1 ar resistance t o  
theoretical  innovation can be noted. 
5 . 1 . 2  U t i l i t y  Theory and Subjective Probabil i ty.  Upon the 
fa i  1 ure of Expected Value theory to  adequately describe the decision- 
making behavior of actual deci sion-makers, the theory was modified 
by introduction of  the concept of " u t i l i t y . "  Without going i n t o  
the technical and mathematical propert ies of u t i l i t y  theory i t  i s  
su f f i c ien t  here t o  define i t  as an index of an individual ' s  personal 
or subjective preference fo r  an outcome, object ,  or event. By re- 
placing the objectively defined concept of "value" (measured in 
monetary un i t s )  with the subjectively defined concept of " u t i l i t y , "  i t  
was hoped tha t  the rat ional  i ty assurption of human decision-making 
could be retained by the simple expedient of proposing t ha t  individuals 
were guided in t h e i r  decision-making by those choices which maximized 
expected u t i l i t y  ra ther  than expected - value. 
Though expected uti  1 i t y  theory fared be t t e r  than i t s  pre- 
decessor in the experimental laboratory in explaining and predicting 
the choice behavior of human subjects ,  anornolous experimental r esu l t s  
continued to be produced fo r  which the revised model was inadequate 
to explain. For example, cer ta in  choice s i tua t ions  could be con- 
structed in which subjects  consistently preferred an a l t e rna t i ve  
t ha t  provided 1 esser  expected uti 1 i ty . Again, the data indicated 
t ha t  the dimensions of decision-making were more numersus and complex 
than those of the explanatory model . 
The dispar i ty  beWeen theory and data then led to  fu r the r  re- 
finement of the rat ional  theory of decision-making, I t  was next pro- 
posed tha t  the objectively defined probabi 1 i t 'es of arevious nodels 
be replaced by what might be called "subjective probabili t ies." The 
idea lwas that individuals, in the i r  decision-making, deal i n  probab- 
i l  i  t i es  in a personal way, judging 1 i  kel ihoods in ways that  we1 1 
misht d i f fe r  from some objectively defined standard. People could be 
expected t o  make the i r  decisions upon the basis of their  own personal 
and subjective feelings about probabil i t i e s ,  rather than upon some 
externally defined measure of 1 i kel i hood. Further, th i s  modification 
in the theory allowed for individual variation in choice behavior and 
decision-making, So i t  was possible, under the theory, for two decis- 
ion-makers with iden t ical  preferences for outcomes t o  be both "ration- 
al"  and arrive a t  different  decisions simply because they differed in 
their  appraisal of the probabil i t i e s  of  various outcomes. This concept 
of  subjective probabil i ty originated l o n g  before decision theory was 
defined as a separate discipl ine,  b u t  was not incorporated into 
decision theory un ti1 fa i r ly  recently. 
Khat has evolved is  essentially a psychological theory of  
decision-making, rather than a truly "rational" theory. With abandon- 
men t o f  the index of monetary value t o  appraise the worth of a1 terna- 
t ives ,  a n d  replacement of objectively defined probabi 1 i t i e s  with per- 
sonal or subjective ones, the burden of understanding and predicting 
the decision-making behavior of individuals and groups has shifted 
from mathematicians and decision theorists t o  soci a1 and behavioral 
sc ien t i s t s .  That actual human decision-makers do not conform to neat 
rational models of deci s i  on-making has become obvious. To under- 
stand how decisions are made, atten t i o n  must n o w  be directed t o  the 
social a n d  psychological factors which af fec t  human decision -makers. 
5 . 2  Social and Psycholagi ca1 'actors in Decis ion-Making 
Some social and psychological factors have a1 ready been iden- 
t i f i ed  by research, t h o u g h  tneir  mode o f  operation i s  n o t  yet  we1 1 
mcerstaoa. Other variables affecting decision-makers will be 
disc3vered through empirical research into such topics as human 
information processing, risk percepticn a n d  outcome evaluation, cog- 
ni t ive biases which affect  various types of  decision-makers , inter-  
actions between the motivational s ta tes  of  decision-makers and 
relevant dimensions o f  particul ar decision problems, perceived re- 
l i ab i l i t y  and source o f  information and i t s  impact upon outcome a n d  
risk evaluation, and several related questions that address the 
human-na ture aspects of  decision -makers and the cons train t s  and  
1 imitations that psychological a n d  social r ea l i t i e s  impose upon the 
decision-making process. 
Along with the realization that  formal and "rational" models 
o f  decision-making are inadequate as descriptive theories of actual 
decision-making, i t  has begun t o  be accepted that social factors also 
play an important role in the behavior of decision makers. The 
individual does n o t  function in a vacuum, b u t  instead i s  part of a 
social and  insti tutional structure which tends t o  shape percepticns 
and values in systematic ways. Thus, t o  understand and predict the 
decision-making process, one must also study the social milieu in 
which i t  takes place. h adequate theory of decision-making, unlike 
theories of the past, must consider the influences o f  societal factors 
upon individual a n d  group decision-makers. 
5 .2 .1  Learning Processes and Decision-rclaking. Knowledge of  
human behavior gleaned from other areas of the behavioral sciences 
can be of great help in understanding the underlying psychological 
and societal factors that affect human decision processes. One area 
deserving further study i n  values i s  the manner i n  which fundamental 
principles of the human learning process interact  with bias and 
place constraints upon decision-making. A 1  though i t  appears obvious 
t h a t  a decisicn-maker i s  also a " learner ,"  there i s  l i t t l e  in the 
empirical or oxperimen tal  1 i terature which deals with chanqes i n  
behavior during the decisi on-making process. Traditional models 
of  decision-making typicaily concept2al ize the world as made up  c f  
s t a t i s t i ca l ly  independent events , a n d  hence nave re1 ied upon mathe- 
matics which embody independence assumpt'ons. Behavicral sc ien t i s t s  , 
however, recognize tha t  there is  a marked s t a t i s t i c a l  dependency in 
real-world events which i s  often mirrored in the laws describing 
human behavior. Unlike ideal decision-makers, human decision-makers 
are affected in their  perception of the present by experiencing the 
consequences of the i r  past decisions. In  some situations this  may 
be appropriate, as when the fisherman who was successful a t  a par t i -  
cular bend in the river in the past returns there in the expectation 
of  again being successful. I n  other s i tuat ions,  however, this very 
"human" character is t ic  works t o  the detriment of  decision-makers, as 
when the gambler, having experienced a s t r ing  of losses a t  roulet te ,  
increases his wagers, falsely reasoning that  his probability of a 
w i n  must have been increased by his past losses. To adequately under- 
stand the dynamics of decision-making, the natural propensities of 
humans t o  perceive the world in a particular manner and the p las t ic i ty  
of behavior subject t o  past events or "reinforcers" must be incorpor- 
ated in our theoreti cal formulations. 
5 .2 .2  Recency and Time Delay. Another important aspect of 
human behavior that  plays a part in the decision-making process 
relates t o  the dimension of recency. According t o  some learning 
theorists , learning takes place when the consequences of  various be- 
havioral acts provide "feedback" t o  the individual in the form of 
rewards and punishments. Behaviors that  produce consequences re- 
warding t o  the individual have an increased probability of a future 
occurrence, whi 1e behaviors that produce punishing consequences have 
a lessened probabil i t y  of future occurrence. Through this  "rein forcing" 
mechanism the consequences of various behaviors serve t o  strengthen 
certain behaviors whi 1e eliminating others. The recency phenomenon, 
we1 1 es tab1 ished through experimental studies on both humans and 
infra-human species in the psychological laboratory, plays an important 
role i n  the learning srocess. P u t  simply, the recency ef fec t  s ta tes  
t h a t  the amount of learning produced by a reward or punishment wi 11 
depend upon the time delay between i t  and the behavior which produced 
i t .  When there i s  a long delay, rewards and punishments do 1 i t t l e  to 
a1 t e r  them; when the delays a re  minimal, rewards and punishments have 
t h e i r  greates t  impact upon learning. Graphically, the relat ionship 
between time delay and amount of learning looks somewhat as shown i n  
the f igure  below. 
I 
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This fundamental principle of human 1 earning has profound e f iec t s  
upon how persons make decisions. I t  follows from tn i s  ? r inc ip le ,  f o r  
example, tha t  individuals wi 11 tend t o  underestimate and undervalue 
the impact of future events, and correspondingly overvalue the immediate 
consequences o f  t h e i r  behaviors. This very human s a r t  of bias i s  re- 
f lec ted i n  such sayings as " A  bird in the h a ~ d  i s  wortn two i n  the bush," 
or " L e t  us ea t  and drink; fo r  tomorrcw we shall  d ie .  ' 
Now, in some instances of decision-making, t h i s  sor t  of bias 
may not be harmful; to a certain degree i t  may be jus t i f i ed ,  in the 
economist's words, t o  "discount" the future.  However, there are a 
number of s i tuat ions in which th i s  aspect of human nature leads 
decision-makers t o  seek short-run gains a t  the expense of objectively 
more desirable long-range ones. In other words, the recency ef fec t  
associated wi t h  the 1 earning process can exercise a systematic bias 
upon a decision-maker's evaluation of a l ternat ives ,  leading him to 
overestimate the value of immediate rewards and underestimate the 
value of delayed rewards. Similarly with punishments; the immediate 
ones are  overvalued, the delayed ones undervalued. For example, the 
immediate discomfort or inconvenience of wearing a sea t  be l t  causes 
some people not t o  use them, thereby increasing the risk of much more 
severe consequences (e .  g .  , death, serious injury) in the future.  Only 
a f t e r  a crash has occurred, and the injury i s  an immediate event rather 
than a remote one, does one regret not wearing a seat be1 t. 
The bias in decision-making caused by the time-delay effect  
can have special ly deleterious effects  when a particular behavior 
produces a mixture of consequences, as ,  for exampl e ,  an immediate small 
reward and a delayed b u t  severe punishment. In th i s  instance the 
time-delay effect  may well lead the decision-maker t o  ignore the future 
punishment in his preference for  immediate gain or reward. For example, 
a decision to drive a f t e r  dr inking  too much alcohol produces an immediate 
reward in the form of readily available transportation, b u t  i,ncreases 
the r isk of a future crash and i t s  accompanying "punishment." 
5 . 2 . 3  Perception of Risk and Probability. In the preceding 
discussion of the time-delay ef fec t ,  attention was directed toward a 
cognitive proczss which, in decision-making 1 anguage, affects  the 
subjective evaluation of outcomes. I t  will be recalled that  the 
deci sion-making models used t o  describe choice behavior are  cornpri sed 
of two classes of variables : tbose deal i n g  wi tn outcomes and the i r  
evaluation by the deci sjon-maker, and  those involved with the appraisal 
of probabi 1 i  t i  es , 1 i kel i hoods, and r i sk .  Behavioral sci  ence can con- 
t r ibu te  a great  deal t o  our understanding of both of those classes of 
variables.  
In the probability or risk-appraisal dimension of the decision- 
making process, one deals primarily w i t h  a perceptual/cogni t i v e  aspect 
of behavior. This involves an aspect of human behavior i n  which there 
i s  a complex intaraction between physiological , social , and environ- 
mental fac tors .  I t  i s  almost a truism t o  say, from a perceptual 
standpoint,  tha t  "objective" r e a l i t y  ex i s t s  only as an idealized s t a t e .  
For example, s tudies conducted in the social psychological laboratory 
have shown tha t  an individual ' s  perception of so simple an event as the 
movement of a l i gh t  source i n  a darkened room i s  greatly affected by 
pr ior  reports of movement made by other persons present. Similarly,  
the motivational s t a t e s  and pre-existing a t t i tudes  and bel iefs  of an 
observer can greatly a f fec t  his perception of a s i tua t ion  (hungry 
persons tend t o  see food items in the ambiguous perceptual f i e l d  of a 
Rcrschach ca rd) .  Everyone i s  also familiar  w i t h  the phenomenon captured 
in the fo1 k wisdom of the proverb, "The grass i s  always greener o n  the 
other s ide  of the fence," or  the Aesop's fable of the "sour grapes.' '  
In these examples the perception of pa r t i cu la r  events or s t a t e s  of the 
world i s  affected by the individual ' s  probabil i ty of achieving a sought- 
fo r  outcome. (The proverb and the fable  const i tu te  competing "theories" 
of behavior; the fcrmer predicts  t ha t  unattainable outcomes are  enhanced 
i n  a t t rac t iveness ,  while the l a t t e r  predicts t ha t  we deal with our s z t -  
backs by minimizing them.) 
Several other behavioral phenomena which can bias our appraisal 
of "real  i  ty"  have been discovered i n the psychoiogi cal 1 aboratory b u t  
have not yet  been integrated i n t o  our theories of decision-making, Tor 
example, i t  has been established tha t  individuals,  when shown a random 
sequence of binary events ( say ,  a s t r ing  of red and blue l i gh t s )  almost 
invariably report  detecting a "pattern ." That 5 s ,  people automatical 1y 
attempt t o  find and impcss an orderly rule or explanation fo r  obserwd 
phenomena or an event when, i n  a s t a t i s t i c a l  sense, such order i s  absent. 
A converse effect  has also been observed. Subjects in a psychological 
experiment have been asked t o  attempt t o  generate a random sequence of 
events--for example, t o  simulate the behavior of a f a i r  coin and s t a t e  
the outcomes of 100 hypothetical f l i p s  of the coin. When these humanly 
generated "random" events are analyzed by s t a t i s t i c a l  t e s t s  of randomness, 
they are almost invariably found t o  be highly non-random--that i s ,  very 
different  from what would be generated by a t ruly random device. 
These two aspects of the human response to randomness have s ig-  
nif icant  implications for  the study and modelling of human r isk behavior. 
What they say i s  that  humans deal quite poorly s ~ i  t h  random 
events because they don' t  recoanize randomness when they see i t ,  a n d  
what they do recognize as "random" (as for  example, self-generated 
sequences) i s  generally in fac t  not random. I t  i s  obvious t o  one obser- 
ving th is  aspect of the perceptual process that  i t  cannot b u t  influence 
the deci s i  on-maki ng process by introducing systematic bias and certainly 
1 ess than optimal performance. 
Another very human foible  which af fec ts  deci s i  on-makers when 
they deal with probabi 1 i t i e s  i s  the i r  suscepti bi 1 i ty t o  selective 
dis tor t ions of memory when evai uating the i r  own prior performances. 
This has been demonstrated in studies where subjects are asked to  
give estimates of the probability of occurrence of particular future 
events. Sometime l a t e r  (weeks or months), the subjects are brought 
back and some are infomed that  the par t icular  events had i n  fac t  
occurred, while others were told they had not. Each group of sub- 
jects  i s  then asked t o  recall  the i r  previous probabi 1 i t y  estimations. 
Subjects told the events had occurred "recall ed" larger probahi 1 i ty -
estimations than they had actually inade; those t o l d  the events 
hadn ' t occurred "recall ed" sw1 1 e r  estimations than they had actual ly 
inade. 
This "hindsight" e f f e c t  i s  riot r e a l l y  surprising to- observers 
of human behavior. We are a1 1 prone t o  recall the past in !ways which 
enhance our self-esteem. However, when we wish or need t o  rely 
upon the past t o  provide us with information and lessons upon which 
t o  base present or future decisions, the "hindsight" e f f ec t  can bias 
our probability estimations, causing the decision-making t o  be l ess  
than optimal. 
Most humans have th i s  "hindsight" bias part ly because most 
humans misunderstand and misapply the concept of "probabi 1 i t y .  " A1 - 
though most persons have an " in tu i t ive"  theory of probabi l i ty ,  in 
many cases i t  varies so much from the objective theory t ha t  the perior- 
mance of untrained individuals in probabi l i ty estimation tasks fa1 1 s 
f a r  below optimal levels .  For example, i n  tasks where humans are  asked 
t o  estimate the probability of a l t e rna t ive  hypotheses, based upon 
samples of data tha t  pertain t o  those hypotheses, humans are  f a r  l e ss  
able to make optimal use of the available probabi l i s t ic  information 
than are s t a t i s t ' c a l  deci s i  on-making models. People general ly tend i n  
such s i tuat ions  to  be what i s  ca l led  "conservative"; tha t  i s ,  they 
change t he i r  estimates of the probabi l i t ies  a t  a slower r a t e  than i s  
cal led fo r  by the available evidence. P u t  another way, human decision- 
makers, a t  l e a s t  untrained ones, do not make fu l l  use of al 1 the 
information availabie t o  them in probabil i ty-estimation tasks.  
The time-delay e f fec t  and biases related t o  perception and cog- 
n i  ti ve processes provide important i 7 1 us t ra t i  ons of some of the short-  
comings of contemporary decision-theory, and pcint o u t  a possible syn- 
thesis. of behavioral theories of learning or, the one hand, and decision- 
theory on the other.  blost exist ing theories of decision-making disregard 
cer ta in  important psycho1 ogi cal and social dimensions of human behavior 
which play a crucial function in the decision-making process--for example, 
the above-noted tendency fo r  persons t o  "discount" the future i n  t h e i r  
appraisal of choices or  a l t e rna t ive  courses of act ion.  8ehavioral- 
learning theories,  f c r  t he i r  p a n ,  typical 1y f a i l  t o  take account o f  the 
purposive planning and goal -seeki nq behavior of humans engaged i n  such 
h i g h l y  organized cornpl ex t a s k s  as informaticn processing and grableg 
solving. A theoret ica l  approach t o  deci sion-maki ng t ha t  uses behavioral 
science knowledge as well as the theoret ica l  power of formal mathe- 
matical models might we1 1 serve to  remedy the shortcomings of our 
present abi l  i t y  to  a f f ec t  the decision-making processes of persons 
engaged in a var ie ty  of a c t i v i t i e s .  Certainly,  taking account of 
ce r ta in  human " l imi ta t ions"  which make us l e ss  than ideal decision- 
makers may make i t  feas ib le  to  formulate decision-making aids t o  improve 
our a b i l i t y  to  make good decisions o r  a s s i s t  us in avoiding some of the 
more obvious shortcomings. 
5 . 3  Sumary and Conclusions 
The theory of human decision processes has evolved t o  a point 
where the underlying social  and psychological f ac to rs  in decision- 
making a r e  of central  concern. A t  f i r s t ,  s impl i s t i c  notions about 
what const i tu ted "ra t ional  " behavior dominated the f i e l d ,  leading 
to  models t h a t ,  while appealing, did not r e f l e c t  the actual behavior 
of most decision-makers, These ear ly  theor ies  dea l t  w i t h  what were 
be1 ieved t o  be the two major ingredients in decision-making : the 
probabi l i t ies  of various events associated with a decision a l t e rna t i ve ,  
and the values associated w i t h  the occurrences of those events. I t  
was found t ha t  real decision-makers often do not, as theory predicted 
they should, combine these two ingredients so t h a t  the decision i s  
mde  on the basis  of maximum expected value across a1 1 a1 ternat ives .  
Substi tut ion of subjective probabi 1 i t i e s  f o r  actual 9robabil i -  
t i e s  and u t i l i t i e s  f o r  values resulted i n  more r e a l i s t i c  theories 
b u t  sh i f ted  the emphasis from the mathematical sciences t o  the social  
sciences. A t  present ,  the major concern in the study of human decision 
processes i s  how to  determine subjective probabil i t i e s  and u t i l  i t i e s  
ra the r  than how to manipulate them. 
The tendency of individuals t o  "discount" the fu tu re  i s  an 
example of a psychological f ac to r  t ha t  influences decisi on-making b u t  
cannot be described in su f f i c i en t  r i gc r  fo r  use i n  ?resent  mathematical 
models. The way past experience i s  used in forming perceptions of the 
present i s  another example of an important b u t  insuff ic ient ly  understzod 
psychologi cal fac tor  affecting deci sion-making. 
With respect t o  r i sk  perception, the l i t e r a t u r e  on human behavior 
iden t i f i e s  several fac tors  re1 evant t o  highway safe ty .  For example, 
in perceiving probability or r i sk ,  people tend to :  
a make insuff ic ient  use of avai lab1 e information, 
a be influenced by pre-existing a t t i tudes  o r  be1 i e f s ,  
e have se lect ive  dis tor t ions  of memory when evaluating 
t he i r  own performance, 
a be influenced by others in a group, and 
a have d i f f i cu l t y  i n  understanding concepts of randomness 
and probabil i ty,  
Efforts to narrow the gap between perceived r i sk  and actual r i sk  
in the Highway Safety Process would c lear ly  be enhanced by taking 
cognizance of what already i s  known i n  the f i e l d  of decision-theory 
and the behavioral sci ences . Further reduction of the "perception 
gap" wi 11 become possible when contributions of mathematical modelers 
and s t a t i s t i c i a n s  a re  combined w i t h  those of behavioral s c i en t i s t s  t o  
form an integrated theory of human decision processes. 
Nhile an integrated theory of human decision processes i s  not 
available,  exist ing theory can be applied i n  the management of the 
t r a f f i c  crash r i sk .  Existing concepts suggest new approaches for  r i sk  
management that  have the i r  foundation in an understanding o f  how 
decisions to  take r isk or avoid r isk a re  made. For example, past 
approaches have re1 i ed heavi ly on increasing the perceived negative 
consequences associated lrri t h  an unsafe ac t  (e .g . ,  prohibiting the ac t  
and sanctioning the offender) .  Decision theory suggests tha t  we should 
also consider reducing the benefit associated with the  a c t ,  s o  t h a t  an  
individuai would be l ess  like11 t o  ?lace himself a t  r i sk .  
cor.test i n  the j%ittire than it hcls i n  the  past.  Unde~s tnrdL~g  
how and i n  what e m t e x t s  people make decisions skou l~?  be a goal. 
Technology will continue t o  play an i m ~ o r t a n t  ro le  i n  the reduction 
of the eras?? r i sk .  The tlse of technology should flow ,Cfiom an 
understandin? of the decis ion process. Tgchnology cannot re3lacz 
the need for  such understanding. 

6.0 IMPROVING THE MANAGENENT OF R I S K  
Th i s  chap te r  p resen ts  b a s i c  9 r i n c i p l  es concern ing  the  manage-' 
m e r i t  o f  r i s k .  The conceptua l  framework s e t  f o r t h  i n  Chapter 5 
desc r ibed  r i s  k-managemen t sys tems as an essen ti a1 e l  emen t o f  t h e  
highway sa fe t y  process. I n  r e a l i t y ,  t he  e n t i r e  hignway sa fe t y  
process i s  a  risk-management process. The formal  a c t i o n s  t h a t  one 
assoc ia tes  w i t h  management, however, t a k e  p l a c e  i n  i n s t i t u t i o n s  
t h a t  e x e r t  ccn t r o l  s  on t he  highway t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  sys tem. 
Management o f  r i s k  i s  a  process analogous t o  o t h e r  managenent 
processes. A body of theory  t h a t  desc r ibes  management e x i s t s  and 
may be a p p l i e d  t o  t h e  management of t h e  t r a f f i c  c rash r i s k .  I n  
t h i s  chap te r ,  b a s i c  management t heo ry  i s  used t o  desc r i be  t h e  r i s k -  
management process. Appl i c a t i o n  o f  rhese b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  can 
improve t h e  ope ra t i ons  of t h e  highway sa fe ty  process.  
R isk  Management i s  a  p r o c s s  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  complet ion of s i x  
d i s c r e t e  b u t  i n t e r r e l a t e d  steps. These s t e p  may be taken by an 
i n d i v i d u a l  i n  making qerscnal  dec i s i ons  about  a  course of  a c t i o n  t o  
f o l  low, by i n s  t i  t u t i o n s  i n  deve lop ing  f o m a l  c o n t r o l  a c t i o n s ,  by 
p u b l i c  e n t i t i e s  i n  gene ra t i ng  formal p u b l i c  p o l i c y ,  and by s o c i e t y  
i n  gene ra t i ng  demand f o r  and suopo r t  o f  t h e  highway sa fe t y  process. 
These s teps ,  d iscussed i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s e c t i o n ,  may be 
s u c c i n c t l y  s t a t e d  as f o l l o w s :  
i Risk  I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ;  
0 i s ' v a ~ l  ishment of ' r i o r i  t i  es ,Among Risks ; 
a D e ~ e q i n a t i o n  o f  Al loca'v'on o f  Resources: 
- 
e S e l e c t i c r l  of qisk-Managemeqt S t r a t e g i e s  ana 1 a c t i c s  ; 
e hplernen t ay i on  o' ? i s  k-Managemen: A c 5 0 n s  ; and 
a E ~ a l u a t i o n  o f  2u t cmes  i n  T e r ~ s  of 2 i s ~  qeduct ion 
6.1 The Process cS  Risk  Management 
O f  these s teps,  r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  t h e  most c r u c i a l ,  s i n c e  
i t  determines whether t h e r e  w i l l  be a  response a t  a l l  by s o c i e t y  
and i t s  r i s k  management systems. F i r s t ,  t h e  magnitude o f  r i s k  must 
be determined and e f f e c t i v e l y  ccmmuni cated t o  a1 1  persons a f f e c t e d  
by i t .  This  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  communication, and r e c e p t i o n  c rea tes  
percep t ions  o f  r i s k  t h a t  govern bo th  i n d i v i d u a l  and soc i  e ta1 behav io r .  
Increased pe rcep t i on  o f  r i s k  leads i n d i v i d u a l s  t o :  
a engage i n  r i s k  avoidance; 
0 suppo r t  t he  c r e a t i o n ,  fund ing ,  and o p e r a t i o n  o f  
risk-managemen t sys terns ; and 
a cooperate w i t h  r i s  k-managemen t sys tems as r i s k -  
management s t r a t e g i e s  a r e  implemented. 
Second, t h e  n a t u r e  o f  r i s k s  must be desc r i  bed i n  s u f f i c i e n t  
d e t a i l  t o  suppor t  f u r t h e r  risk-managemen t a c t i o n .  In fo rmat ion  must 
e x i s t  concern ing how r i s k  i s  c rea ted  and what d i s u t i l i t i e s  r s ~ l t ,  
when, and why. 
E x i s t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  on t h e  t r a f f i c  c rash r i s k  i s  l i m i t e d  and 
appa ren t l y  n o t  we1 1  understood. Appendix A b r i e f l y  compares t he  
d i s u t i l  i ty o f  t r a f f i c  crashes ,w i t h  d i s u t i l  i t y  r e s u l t i n g  from o t h e r  
s o c i e t a l  r i s k s .  The Appendix a l s o  summarizes da ta  on t r a f f i c  c rash 
causa t ion  drawn from t h e  most r e c e n t  NHTSA s tudy .  The ma jo r  p o i n t s  
t h a t  can be drawn from these summaries a re :  
8 Soc ie t y  appears t o  view t r a f f i c  crashes as l e s s  o f  a  
s o c i e t a l  ?roblem than  o t h e r  r i s k s   hat c r e a t e  g r e a t e r  
d i s u t i  1 i t y .  
a Human f ac to r s  a re  t he  predominant cause of t r a f f i c  
crashes. Environmental  ( i n c l u d i n g  highway re1 a ted)  
and v e h i c l e  f a c t o r s  f o l l o w  i n  cha t  o rde r .  
Th is  i n f o r rna t i cn  suggest; t h a t  g r e a t e r  e f f o r t s  a re  war ran ted  t o  
i den ti fy and e f f e c t i \ i e l y  commun i c a t e  t he  nagn i tude o f  the t r a f f i c  
cr3sn r i s k .  Fu r t he r ,  i t  saqc j2~ t s  t h a t  hunian f a c t z r s  -nus: be  examine^ 
i n  g r e a t e r  d e r a i  i t o  develop i n  f o rmz t i on  t o  supoo r t  r i s k  management 
a c t f v i t i e s .  (Xote t h a t  the  Cact t h a t  a hcman f a i l i n g  caus2d a crash 
does n o t  mean that  the only response should be directed against the 
driver. A change in the vehicle, the highway, or b o t h  may be nore 
effective.  Many fai  1 ures, however, appear t o  warrant action directed 
a t  the driver. ) 
A basic part of the risk-identification process i s  the deter- 
mination of risk iden t i  f icat ion requirements. The con tent  of infor- 
mation needed by users t o  perform risk-management functions must be 
specified. Effective methods o f  communicating this  information must 
also be specified. While risk-iden t i f ica t ion  requirements cannot be 
specified in detail a  pr ior i ,  a minimal requirement i s  that both the 
magnitude and 1 i  kel i  hood of various types of crashes be described in 
terns that  can be understood by individual cit izens and  by ins t i  t u -  
tions that must establish and implement policies for  managing the 
t r a f f i c  crash risk.  
After particular t r a f f i c  crash risks have been ident i f ied;  
p r io r i t i e s  among them need t o  be establ ished. This step involves 
ranking specific crash risks and categories o f  risks in order o f  the 
magnitude of the threats they pose t o  society. Extremely rare events 
with very low d i su t i l i t y  receive the lowest rank, while frequent 
events tha t  create great d i su t i l i  ty receive the highest rank. 
Thus, highway safety r i sks ,  t o  be non-trivial ,  must be assoc- 
iated w i t h  a  "reasonably high" 1 ikelihood of  occurring, - a n d  when the 
events occur, the d i s u t i l i t y  must be "suff ic ient ly  undesirabie." 
Clearly, a  major requirement of highway safety research i s  t o  provide 
operational definit icns of "reasonably high" and  "suff ic ient ly  unde- 
s i rable ."  
Establishing pr ior i t ies  among risks i s  actually the f i r s t  o f  
three steps that  are closely interrelated.  I n  the other two s teps,  
deter~inaxion of  a1 location of resources and selection o f  risk-manaae- 
nen t s'cracegies and t ac t i c s ,  comprehensive Drograms of risk rsduction 
are designed t~ deal with r'sks ranked macceptably h i g h .  
Allocation of resources takes place in two cantexts. The f i r s t  
ref lects  the general societal  decision allocating resourc2s based cn 
the relat ive importance o f  a particular class o f  risks among a l l  other 
classes of risks.  The second context relates  t o  allocation of assign- 
ed resources among the s t rategies  and tact ics  selected for  dealing 
with risks within the specif ic  class. 
The selection of s t rategies  and tact ics  must be a systematic 
analysis. The nature, magnitude, dynamic characteris t i c s ,  costs ,  
and societal acceptabi 1 i  ty of control forces associated wi t h  expected 
effects must be considered. This systematic process i s  not generally 
followed today, even though claims are made by a multitude of  system 
inanagers that  such management methods are applied. 
Such a systematic analysis i s  l ikely t o  identify risks that 
cannot be reduced t o  desired levels by applying existing caunter- 
measures. These risks nus t be addressed through research t o  identify 
and evaluate new control forces. 
After risks have been ident i f ied,  ranked, and programs developed 
t o  deal with them, the next step in the risk-management process i s  
implementation of risk-nanagement actions. Here, a1 1 ac t iv i t i e s  
necessary for operation of risk-management programs are performed. 
Such ac t iv i t i e s  range from provision of funds for programs t o  actual 
application of control forces (e .g .  , a r re s t  of an offelder by a 
police of f icer ,  or treatment of an injured person). Included are 
such diverse ac t iv i t ies  as recruitment a n d  training of operational 
personnel (2 .9 .  , ambulance d r ive r s ) ,  the monitoring of operational 
methods and procedures (e. g . ,  suspension of a driver l icense) ,  and  
the purchase a n d  rnaili tenance of equipment (e -g .  , pol i c e  ca r s ) .  
Ideally , the determination of functional requirements 'or imp1 emen t- 
i n g  risk-aanagernent s t rztegies  should fcllow a jysteqatic process 
whereby the perscnnel , equipment, faci 1 i t i e s ,  and other resaurces ar? 
allocated cn the basis o f  their  c m t r i b u ~ i o n  t o  the effectiveness s f  
The total  r i  sic-inmagernen t systen. Yn=ar',~;nattiy, the sys ternwide 
coordination necessary for such an approach seldom occurs in the real 
world (18).  
The final step in the r i s  k-management process i s  the eval uation 
of outcomes in terms of risk reduction. The purpose of this  step i s  
t o  identify effective control forces a n d  risk reducticn programs, so 
that they nay be more widely applied, and t o  identify forces a n d  
actions that have n o t  worked, so they may be improved or discarded. 
The concept of risk-managemen t requires that  evaluation must he re- 
lated in some reasonable way t o  the reduction of risk.  Reliance on 
ultimate measures such as actual reduction o f  crash losses i s  prob- 
ably n o t  feasible for most programs, particularly locai ones. I t  i s  
more reasonable t o  target a risk-management approach on a particular 
category of risk and then measure change in that  risk (e.g. , re- 
duction in the frequency of a particular lasafe driving ac t ) .  
I t  i s  c r i t ica l  that  evaluations be conducted a n d  the results -
communicated t o  the r i s  k-management system and society. Society's 
wi 11 ingness t o  tolerate  and support risk-managemen t act ivi ty  depends 
on soci eta1 perceptions of benefits. Frankness in sharing infor- 
mation on successes and fai lures  i s  a necessity. This requires that  
programs n o t  be oversold. The consequences of  evaluations that show 
no  reduction i n  risk are often disastrous for  program managers w h o  
have ?remised t o o  much. We need t o  develop a clear societal under- 
standing of  the complexity of the t r a f f i c  crash risk and  of the highway 
safety process. S imp1  e solutions ( tha t  are societal l y  acceptable) are 
n o t  l ikely t o  be found  i n  the near furare. 
The Traffic Law System--An I1 7 ustration 
The preceding sectlon d i  scussed the r i  sk-aanagement process i n  
the c~n-cext o f  the conceptual framework o f  the highway safgty Drocesi, 
This section describes the Traffic Law System, which i s  one of the 
formal risk-sanagement systems wifhin :ne hiahway s a f e ~ y  prscess. 
Examinailon 3f the 'unctions and  operations o i  t n i  s r i  i k-~anagement 
systen d i l l  nelp t o  c lar i fy :ile e3ncelti and ~r inci3l .s  develsped 11 
~ r i o r  iect'ons . 
The Tra f f i c  iaw System may be described as s c c i e t y ' s  formal 
mechanism fo r  applying law t o  management of  the t r a f f i c  crash r i sk .  
Law i s  app l ied  i n  a variety of  Nays. I n  t h i s  1 imited examination we 
focus on operations of the law system tha t  deal with the system user 
--predominantly the d r ive r ,  a1 though general provisions of the "rules 
of  the road" also deal with other  users (e.  g . ,  owners, pedestr ians,  
b i cyc l i s t s ,  e t c .  ). 
The usa of the law may be seen in several contexts of equal 
impcrtance. Law i s  used in a posi t ive  sense to  provide guidance fo r  
normal operations of the Highway Transportation System. These guide- 
1 ines provide a s e r i e s  of common expectations (e .  g .  , we wi 1 1  a1 1 
drive on the r igh t  s ide  of the highway) t ha t  f a c i l i t a t e  daily ac t iv-  
i ty ,  These guidelines,  drawn from theoret ica l  understanding of r i s k ,  
suggest o r  require conduct t ha t  reduces r i sk .  
The law a l so  operates t o  prohibi t  act ions t ha t  create  increased 
r isk .  The law provides a formal system fo r  dealing w i t h  individuais 
who v io la te  the proscrigt ions.  This use of the law i s  embedded in 
the concept of deterrence. 
The premise of deterr2nce i s  tha t  a behavior can be prevented 
by the th rea t  of punishment. Most theories of deterrence a r e  based 
on the hypothesis tha t  a person contemplating a prohibited ac t i v i t y  
wil l  refrain from acting i f  the expected benef i t  derived from the 
ac t i v i t y  i s  less  than the expected cost  resdl t i n g  from some th rea t -  
ened punishment ( 3 0 ) .  The i i t e ra tu re  disi-,inguishes bebdeen k o  forms 
of deterrence,  so-call ed "speci a1 deterrence,"  which prclven t s  the 
punished par t ies  from engaging fu r the r  in the undesi red a c t i v i t y ,  and 
"general deterrencz," which disccurages - a l l  illembers o f  a given grouo 
frcm ensaging ; n  the acL_ivity even i f  they are  n o t  caught and 
punished ( 3 1 ) .  
The forr~la? means f c r  crea-,'ng n,eterren; threats to risky he- 
navior w i  tnin ',he 2TS i s  :ne Tra f f i c  Law Sys-uem I T L S j .  I n  ef'ecz, 
slrc3 ~ h r e a t s  [ ? . g . ,  d r i e r  l 'cense si;soension, f:nes, j a i l ]  a re  the 
control forces of the TLS and  are developed as the TLS performs i t s  
four top-1  eve1 functions: law generation, enforcement, adjudication, 
and sanctioning (18).  See Figure 5-1. The objectives of these 
functions may be stated as follows (19 ,32) :  
Law Generation 
a Define risk precisely; 
a Proscribe behavior that creates r isk;  
0 Prescr'ibe behavior that  reduces r isk;  and 
0 Provide for operation of the TLS through procedural 
guide1 ines , creation of the necessary enti t i e s ,  
a n d  funding. 
En forcemen t 
0 Detect and apprehend risk-takers for further system 
action; 
@ Manipulate human behavior t o  reduce r isk;  and  
* Collect basic data t o  identify risk. 
Adjudication 
0 Determine i f  risk-taking occurred i n  the case of 
individuals apprehended by En forcement; 
0 Determine validity of r isk grescriptions by L a w  
Generation ; and 
0 Provide fundamental fai  mess essential for  system 
operation. 
Sanctioning 
a Provide ultimate system response designed t o  ensure 
that the sanctioned individual will not engage in 
r i s  k-taking in the future (special deterrence) ; a n d  
0 Provide a pattern of responses t o  individual risk- 
taking that  influences a1 l potential risk-takers t o  
refrain from such action (general deterrence). 
A wide variety of  governmental agencies a n d  insti t i l t ions arE 
involved i n  p r f o r ~ i n g  thes? funct'ons. Because our system o f  
government is based on the doctrine o f  separation of  powers, n o  
- I  sing12 agency 3r inst i tut ion i s  i n  charge o f  the wnole systsm. \ ? e r e  
i s  n o  'iys';ern nanager" f o r  zne TLS or for any at9er formal societai 
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control sys tem. ?lo "sys tern speci f i  cation" exists for  describing I 
!what the nationwide TLS must do or how i t  must do i t ,  nor are there 
nationwide "subsystem s7ecifications" that  t e l l  how the components 
of the TLS should perform in relation t o  each other and  to the whole 
system. I n  rea l i ty ,  the TLS i s  a "system of systems," each unit 
o ~ e r a t i n g  in varying degrees of independence from the other,  b u t  a l l  
loosely bound together by a se t  o f  principles that encompass the 
ent i re  spectrum of human values, ranging from those implicit in our 
culture t o  those expl ici t ly  addressed in our federal Constitution. 
The Law Generation function i s  performed by federal ,  s t a t e ,  and 
local governments operating under 1 egal constraints imposed by 
federal and s t a t e  laws, constitutions , and judicial precedents. 
Legislative bodies create formal statements ( j  .e. , s ta tu tes )  of 
prohibited HT5 risks a n d  the ~ e n a l  t i e s  for engaging in risky be- 
havior. Laws, in the form of regulations, are also generated by 
adminis t r a ~ i  ve agencies i n  the executive branch of government. I n  
addition t o  proscribing risky behavior and punishments, laws a1 so 
authorize operation of other components of  the TLS ( e . g . ,  agencies 
for 1 i cens ing drivers , pol ice departmen~s) and provide direction and 
constraints on operations of those components (e .  g .  , procedures for 
the a r res t  o f  a driver for  risky behavior). More informal, de facto 
1 aws are generated by other instrumental i t i  es of government through, 
for example, creation of  speed limits and posting of  stop signs. 
S t i l l  more informal, b u t  just  as r ea l ,  laws are created by individ- 
ual s--for example, the 201 ice officer aho makes a reculation through 
directing t r a f f i c  ( 3 2 ) .  
The Enforcement function i s  performed by s t a t e  and local pol ice 
qencies .  Primary operational sub- functions incl ude: 
m Cetection o f  7aw \ / ioIators;  
0 Aporehension; 
0 Observation of the apprehended suspect t o  help decide 
whether or n o t  t o  a r res t  or issiie a ci tat'on; and 
8 Arrest and post-arrest 3rxessfng o f  a suspected l a w  
violatar.  
i n  im~or tant  secondary sub-function of Enforcenent i s  t o  provide 
a deterrent threat t o  potential risk-takers simply through the pres- 
ence of police or police symbols. Research suggests that  police 
presence influences some driver behaviors ( e .g . ,  speeding) associated 
with some crash losses ( 3 3 ) .  Enforcement also suoports operation of 
the ent i re  TLS by providing information on the nature of  r isk (e .g . ,  
from ar res t /c i  tation records, from accident reports) .  
The Adjudication function of the TLS i s  most commonly associated 
with t r a f f i c  courts,  where the rules o f  criminal procedure are fol 1 - 
owed t o  determine the gu i l t  or innocence of individuals accused of 
violating t r a f f i c  laws. Major sub-functions o f  th i s  judicial adjud- 
ication process are: 
a Determination of the charge t o  be made against the 
su.spect; and  
Conduct of pre-trial  hearing t o  inform the accused 
violator of the charge and  his r ights ,  and t o  determine 
the gu i l t  or innocence of the accused violator.  
The l a s t  sub-function, cgmrnonly referred t o  as the " t r i a l "  when 
conducted by the judiciary, has as i ts  objective the finding of fac t  
and law related t o  a particular event and individual. 
I t  must be enphasized that  the Adjudication function i s  n o t  
always performed by a court o f  the judicial branch o f  government. 
Driver 1 icense agencies often h o l d  administrative hearings where 
findings of facts are made by a hearing of f icer .  Further, in order 
t o  expedite the processing of violations of lower r i sk ,  some offenses 
have been "decriminal i zed, " 1 essening the due process requi rements 
( e . g . ,  New York) wherein minor t r a f f i c  cases are handled by an agency 
of the executive branch o f  government ( i ,  e. , the Department o f  gotor 
'Jehicles). 
St ' l l  less formal adjudication przcasses often cccur. For 
examole, a police off icer  nay decide dhetner a driver he has s t o p ~ e d  
i s  gliil ty c i  an offense and decice .no t  t g  a r res t  or decide t c  i s s u e  
a waging, thus ~ r e c i    ding fuiner acc,'cn b y  fornal adjudication 
components cf the TLS, Similarly, a prosecutor may decide n o t  t o  
charge or t o  reduce a charge in exchange for a promise t o  undergo 
treatment for  some condition ( e . g . ,  alcoholism) that led t o  the off-  
ense. In most instances, however, i t  i s  the driver himself who 
adjudicates a f t e r  receiving a citation by pleading guil ty or fo r fe i t -  
ing bail ( 3 2 ) .  
The Sanctioning function provides the ultimate deterrent threat 
o f  the TLS. Again, i t  i s  performed by the judiciary ( e . g .  , imposing 
a f i n e ) ,  by an administrative agency ( e . g . ,  suspending a driver 
l icense) ,  or by a police of f icer  ( e . g . ,  issuing a warning). The pur- 
pose o f  the punishment i s  t o  prevent future occurrences of the risky 
behavior by the punished ?ar t ies  a n d  by other individuals who wish 
t o  avoid punishment. 
The basic steps o f  risk-managemen t are performed within each of 
the functional areas of the TLS. Each individual or agency should 
deliberately go thrgugh each s te:, t o  effectively a n d  eff ic ient ly  
discharge the r i  sic-managemen t mission. In  acdi t ion,  each functional 
area has responsibility for performance of some of the steps for  the 
7LS as a whole. For example, the enforcement function has special 
respcnsibi l i t ies  t o  develop information on r isks and share them with 
other components of  the system. I n  a similar sense, Law Generation 
must t ranslate  general information on risk in t o  operational defin i -  
t i  ons of  prescribed and proscribed behaviors, The r i s  k-management 
process i s  applicable in b o t h  a macro or system smse  and i n  a micro 
or individual agency sense. 
In  1970, we analyzed the performance of the TLS as a risk manage- 
ment system and found i t  conceptually sound b u t  with insufficient re- 
sources t o  manage hTS risk effectively.  The level of  resources avail-  
able t o  the TLS was sesn as a r e f l x t i o n  of  :he public 's  mispercep- 
tion of  tne net d i su t i l i t y  of the 87s. We concludes that tnis  was 
due t o  a l ack  o f  grecise knowledge o f  risk a n d  a lack 31 comrn~nica- 
ticn t o  the public o f  ~xis ' , 'ng 'tncwledge about risk. Our s t ~ i d y  also 
f o u n d  that the principles of risk-management often were not being 
applied by the TLS and tha t ,  as a r e su l t ,  existing resources were 
n o t  being effectively ut i l ized.  Minimal coordination among the 
various elements of the TLS was found, resulting in a l a c k  or' common 
pur?ose and in actions that  (were coun ter-productive t o  achievemen t 
o f  ultimate system objectives. The f a i lu re  of  the TLS t o  operate as 
a sys tem was seen t o  resul t  in serious inconsistencies in TLS in te r -  
actions w i t h  the HTS, society,  a n d  other RMSs, a n d  even in non-per- 
formance of major risk-managemen t functions a t  the sys tern 1 eve1 (e. g., 
risk ident i f icat ion) .  Thus, s ignif icant  violations of  a l l  steps of  
the risk-managenen t process were found t o  be commonplace in the TLS. 
6 . 3  Sumrnarv and Conclusions 
The method by which the risk-management systems operats is  
described as the risk-management process. This process i s  also used 
for  individual and societal decisi on-making about the highway safety 
process. Basic steps i n  the process are: 
a Risk Identification; 
a Establishment of Pr ior i t ies  Among Risks; 
a Determination of A 1  location of Resources ; 
a Selection of Risk Management Strategies a n d  Tactics; 
a Implementation of Ris k-Management Actions; and  
a Evaluation of Outcomes i n  Terms of Risk Reduction 
All of these steps are c r i t i ca l  for proper operation of the 
risk-management systems and the highway safety process. 
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7.0 ANALYZING HIGHWAY SAFETY NEEDS:  AN APPLICATION 
OF THE NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The preceding sections of t h i s  paper have demonstrated the need 
for  treating the problem of highway safety within the context o f  
the societal systems that  generate a n d  attempt t o  deal with dis- 
uti 1 i t i e s  caused by highway crashes. A conceptual framework for  
analyzing these systems a n d  the i r  interrelationships was presented, 
and the processes through which people make decisions about risk 
were discussed. Some major problem areas and needs in risk-manage- 
ment were mentioned. 
The purpose of this  sec:ion is  t o  show how our conceptual 
framework can be used t o  analyze overall highway safety problems and 
needs in a more orderly and meaningful way than has previously been 
possible. The analysis leads t o  a concise statement of top-level 
requirements for managing highway crash risk and serves as a pofnt of 
departure for future,  more extensive analyses. 
7 . 1  Problem Analysis 
Our conceotual framework sigges ts  that  problems i n  managing 
crash risk may be placed in three general categories. The categor- 
i es contain probl ems pertaining t o :  
(1) the description of the Highway Saf2ty Process (HSP), 
( 2 )  decision-making within the YSP, and 
( 2 )  communication within the HS?. 
The tern "Highway Safety ?rocessN describes the complex of inter-  
acting societal systems t h a t  crcats and control highway crash dis- 
u t i l i t y  (sse Chapter 4 . 3 ) .  Some cS the more obvious risk-management 
problems within these categories ar? d i scussed  below. 
7.1.1 Description o f  the Highway Safety Process. The 
l i t e ra tu re  on hishway safety contains no  record o f  an attempt t o  
develop a description of the ent i re  HSP. The lack of a comprehen- 
sive theory has, in f ac t ,  precluded such a global presentation of 
the process. Researchers have yet t o  identify a l l  of the ESP elements 
and thei r  components. The res u l  t has been fragrnen ted , pi ecemeal 
descriptions of elements believed t o  be important t o  a given r e s t r i c -  
ted analysis. Any analysis of the performance of  the SSP as a whole 
has been impossible for the most fundamental of  reasons: a l l  of the 
parts of the system have n o t  Seen identified.  As a consequence o f  
the fragmented conceptual framework used in past highway safety 
ac t iv i t i e s ,  the mos t neglected comoonents of the HSP have Seen those 
related t o  control of crash d i su t i l i t y .  Nhile many of the major 
components of  the HTS ( e .  g. , drivers ,  vehicles, roads) have been 
dissected t o  identify the i r  constituent parts i n  great de ta i l ,  very 
few studies have atzempted t o  i so la te  a n d  classify the societal a n d  
Risk Management System components of the HSP. No e f fo r t  t o  identify 
a l l  of the significant parts of the societal  and RMS components has -
ever been made. 
Similar problems exis t  5n  describing the functions of the HSP. 
Several studies have analyzed seiected functions of the HTS and RMSs, 
b u t  few studies have attempted t o  develop hierarchies c f  functions 
in relation t o  top-level subsystem and system objectives. There has 
never been a functional analysis o f  the en t i re  HS?, nor any formal 
attempt even t o  identify a l l  of chese functions. N j t h  respect t o  the 
HTS, o n l y  the operational function seems t o  have received much 
attention in sthe highway safety 1 i terature.  Analyses of lower-le\/e? 
HTS functicns involving interactions between driver and vehicle i n  a  
particular ariving scenario ( ca l l  ed task analyses) have sometimes 
been conducted i n  detai i , b u t  rei ate6 f ~ n c t i c n s  that must Se perfomec! 
in the course of t x a l  driving "~~l i ss ions"  ( e .  g.,  a ~ r i o  t o  the  s f f i ce  
?n a busy ?xoressway) have n o t  Seen described i q  the same degree c f  
detai I. Some f ~ n c t i o n s  o f  some ?MSs ( e .  3. , mer2ency rned'ca? 
se rv i ces ,  p o l i c e  t r a f f i c  s e r v i c e s )  have a l s o  been i d e n t i f i e d ,  and i n  
one case ( t h e  T r a f f i c  Law System) a  fo rma l  f u n c t i o n a l  a n a l y s i s  has 
been performed. However, t he  f u n c t i o n s  o f  many components of RMSs 
(e.g. ,  p r i v a t e  s a f e t y  founda t ions ,  insurance  companies) have n o t  
been descr ibed  i n  s u f f i c i e n t  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and few 
f unc t i ona l  d e s c r i p t i o n s  have been r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  func t ions  of r i s k -  
man agemen t. 
Wi thou t  a  comprehensive l i s t  o f  components and f u n c t i o n s  of t h e  
HSP, t h e  requi rement  f o r  a s t r u c t u r e  i n t e r r e l a t i n g  t h e  func t ions  and 
t h e i r  performance cannot be met. Thus, t h e r e  i s  no way o f  knowing 
e x a c t l y  how any g iven  f u n c t i o n  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  accompl i shmen t of  
r i s k  management o b j e c t i v e s ,  o r  how t h a t  f u n c t i o n  a f f e c t s  t h e  accorn- 
p l i shmen t  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  and f u n c t i o n s  of o t h e r  components. As a  
r e s u l t ,  RMS c o n t r o l  fo rces  cannot be eva lua ted  i n  terms of  t he  
func t ions  t h a t  produced then, and t he  design and development o f  new 
forces a re  h indered  by t he  l a c k  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  about what works and 
what does n o t  work i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  crash d i s u t i l i t y .  
With r espec t  t o  t he  ou tpu ts  o f  t h e  HSP, the  requi rement  t o  
desc r i be  the  d i s u t i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  HTS has Seen addressed most f re -  
q u e n t l y  by p a s t  highway s a f e t y  research. Such research has i d e n t i -  
f i e d  events  immediate ly  p r i o r  to ,  du r i ng ,  and f o l l o w i n g  crashes, and 
has developed a v a r i e t y  o f  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  d i s u t i  1  i ti es. 
However, t he  r i s k s  and d i s u t i l i t i e s  have n o t  been adequate ly  examined 
w i t h  respec t  t o  events o r  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  occur  o r  e x i s t  f a r  i n  ad- 
vance o r  l o n g  a f t e r  a  crash, so t h a t  many p o t e n t i a l  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  i n t e r d i c t i n g  t h e  s e r i e s  o f  events l e a d i n g  t o  d i s u t i l i t y  have n o t  
been i d e n t i f i e d .  
An a d d i t i o n a l  prcb lem i s  t h a t  c rash d i s u t i l i ~ i e s  t h a t  have been 
s t u d i e d  have n o t  been adequately descr ibed  i n  terms t h a t  d i l l  s ~ p o o r t  
risk-managernen: a c t i c n s ,  i. e. , l w i  t h  r espec t  t o  t h e  r i s k  asscc i a t3d  
w i t h  the  d i s u t i l i t i e s ,  t c  o t h e r  non-YiS r i s k s ,  and t o  n o r n a t i v e  
values o f  f ac to r s  r e l a t e d  t o  d i s u t i l i  t i e s .  The same s i  t a a t i o n  exis:; 
with respect t o  u t i l i t i e s  o f  the HTS, whicb have received f a r  less 
attention than the d i su t i l i t i e s .  Particularly,  n o  attempt has been 
made t o  compare the u t i l i t i e s  and  disut i l  i t i e s  associated with 
particular HTS ac t iv i t ies  a n d  collections of  ac t iv i t ies  i .  e. , 
missions, a n d  t o  re late  the resulting net u t i l i t y  or d i su t i l i t y  t o  
"risky" or "safe" driving behavior. 
Much more attention has been given t o  identifying the outputs 
of  the HTS than the o u t p t s  of the RiclSs. in general, neither the 
effectiveness nor disuti 1 i t i e s  of RMS control forces are known. The 
resul t  i s  that resources are commonly wasted on ineffective safety 
programs, and potentially effective programs are rejected because 
the i r  disut i l  i t i e s  are perceived as greater than the crash d i su t i l -  
i t i e s  they seek t o  reduce. The rescinding o f  federal regulations 
requiring seatbelts t o  be interlocked with a ca r ' s  ignition system 
and the repeal of mandatory helmet use laws for motorcyclists in 
some states  are examples of public refusal t o  accept RMS "cures" 
perceived as worse than the " i  1 lnesses" they were di rected against. 
Figure 7-l'summarizes existing major problems in developing an 
HS? description t o  support risk-management, The problems are 
show? relative t o  the three major elements of the HSP, i . e . ,  the 
HTS, RMSs, and society. 
7 . 1 . 2  D l .  
Considerable progress has been made in recent years in developing 
theoretical models of decision-making a n d  i n  understanding psycho- 
logical and  social factors that  enter into the applications of  such 
models. However, a t  present, no s ingle ,  integrated theory of 
decision-making is  avai lab1 e for rigorous a p p l  icatf on t o  the f ie ld 
of  highway safety. 
Yajor d i f f i c ~ l  t ies  ex is t  i n  translating existing knowledge 
from the behav'orai sciences ' n t a  te-s useful 'or jmproving opera- 
tional decision-flaking. 'cr example, i t  is n o t  c:ear how t h e  kncw- 
ledge that most ~ e o p l e  20 n c t  ys? in=ormaticn ?fLicicntiy i q  

estimating risk can be used t o  bet ter  present information about crash 
risk t o  police managers. Neither i s  i t  known h o w  t a  use knowledge 
about the tendency of  human decis ion-makers t o  discaun t rhe future 
t o  stop legis lators  from responding only t o  short-term highway 
safety pressures and ignoring problems that k i l l  create f a r  greater 
pressures in the future. Nevertheless, given the d i f f icu l ty  of  the 
task, the greatest  deficiency i n  meeting Y S ?  requirements with regard 
t o  decision-making i s  that  there has been an insuff icient  e f fo r t  t o  
attsmpt this  translation. Thus, much potentially useful knowledse 
i s  not being used t o  improve perceptions and decision-making in the 
HSP. The fai lure  t o  use existing knowledge--a major current problem-- 
is  discussed la te r  in section 7 .1 .4 .  
Research effor ts  t o  gather new knowledge in the area of human 
decision processes are inadequate. A recent study in England r?- 
vealed only a handful of  publications about decision-making that  
were re1 evan t t o  hi gnway safety. No federal ly sponsored U .  S. programs 
are concerned with describing current perceptions about risk within 
the HSP.  No known research i n  th is  country i s  examining how per- 
ceptions about crash risk are formed and how decisions about risk- 
responses are made. Thus, present k n o w l  edge about decision-making i s  
not being used, and  there are essent ial ly  n o  programs t o  promote the 
use of th is  knowledge or t o  develop new k n o w l  edge. 
7 .1 .2  Communication 'lli thin the hicjhway S a f e t y  Process. 
No system-wide information system has ever been designed for rhe 
en t i re  HSP,  a n d  ttlere i s  n o  record of any analysis o f  the content, 
form, or method of delivery o f  infornation needed by various compon- 
ents o f  the ASP. Formal information "systems" that do exis t  are 
mainly rsposi tories there information i s  stored rather t h a n  dissem- 
inated. These reqositories are usually designed t o  a e e t  the needs 
of special ized user grouos, rnost freauen t l y  researcneys , a n d  are 
most 3ften located a t  tne f a c i i i  t i e s  o f  t ne  user grouos. Sucn cisw 
I SrouDs incl ude tne 'scleral governmen-, ,e. 3. , :.IFTSA's 'atai ICCI den t 
F i l e ) ,  universit ies (e.g. , HSRI ' s  Information Center), and private 
safety foundations a n d  associations ( e .  g .  , the Uational Safety 
Council, Yotor 'lehicl e Yanufacturers Association, and the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators). A few information 
"services" (e.  g .  , the Transportation Research Information System or 
TRIS) ex i s t  t o  a s s i s t  persistent seekers of highway safety informa- 
t ion,  b u t  some familiarity with the 1i terature  and the organization 
of the retrieval systems i s  necessary for effect ive use of  these 
services. 
The most serious problem in communication i s  i n  meeting needs 
of  the public and of operational components o f  the HTS a n d  RMSs. No 
ongoing, integrated program t o  provide t o  these components informa- 
tion about risk and RMS control forces has ever exist2d a t  the 
national 1 evel. 
Efforts t o  communicate with the publ  i c  have mainly been in the 
form of sporadic p u b l  i c  in fornation a n d  education "campaigns" in 
support of countermeasures aimed a t  par t icular  behaviors associated 
with crashes (e. g. , speeding, drunk driving).  The effectiveness of 
most of  these campaigns in modifying behavior has n o t  been denonstra- 
ted. The l i t e ra tu re  on highway safety provides n o  evidence of  studies 
performed t o  determine what kinds of information provided in what 
form t o  what groups are required t o  enhance risk perceptions and t o  
support rational decision-making i n  deal i n g  with risk. 
With respect t o  RMSs, the major communications problem i s  in 
providing information from existing r e ~ o s i t o r i e s  o f  knowledge in a 
form sui table  for risk-management a t  s t a t e  and local levels of  
govemmen t. I t  i s  a t  rhese levels ,  where ooerational risk-aanage- 
mat strategies  and tac t ics  are de\ ie io~ed,  tha t  mosr: resources are 
expended 2nd  control forces are actually ~ ~ o i i e d .  " e t ,  s t a t e  a n d  
local units o f  govepnment have the leas t  access t o  information needed 
'or these =unctions. Gnrnet needs c'i' chese ?F1S cmpcne~',s OanSe 
f ~ c m  conci se scat2-of-cnowi edge rsvi ews ~ D C L I T ,  r isk,  ~3 man L ( z ' ~  f a r  
o p e r a t i n g  countermeasure orograms, t o  su rveys  o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
e v a l  u a t i o n s  o f  p a s t  programs. 
F i g u r e  7-2 s.umrnarizes some m a j o r  communicat ion problems i n  
managing h ighway c r a s h  r i s k .  
7.1 .4  Use o f  E x i s t i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n .  Examina t i on  o f  p a s t  
h ighway s a f e t y  e f f o r t s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  c c n c l u s i o n  t h a t  i n f o r m a t i o n  and 
knowledge t h a t  a r e  c u r r e n t l y  a v a i l a b l e  a r e  f r e q u e n t l y  n o t  used i n  t h e  
des ign  o r  development o f  h ighway s a f s t y  programs. 
The r i s  k-managemen t process  has been d e s c r i b e d  i n  scme d e t a i  1. 
T h i s  i s  n o t  a new concept .  We s t a t e  i t  i n  s p e c i f i c  te rms b u t  i t  has 
been a p a r t  o f  t h e  genera l  management l i t e r a t u r e  f o r  many yea rs .  
Yet ,  cne does n o t  f i n d  such management concepts  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n c o r -  
p o r a t e d  w i t h i n  t h e  1 i t e r a t u r e  on h ighway s a f e t y  program management. 
C u r r e n t  h ighway s a f e t y  program l i t e r a t u r e  r e f e r s  t o  a t h r e e -  
s t e p  process :  (1) prob lem i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  ; ( 2 )  program development 
and imp lemen ta t i on ;  and ( 3 )  e v a l u a t i c n .  I n  a genera1 sense t h i s  i s  
c l o s e  t o  t h e  r isk-management p rocess .  The d i f f e r e n c e  l i e s  i n  t h e  
emphasis t h e  l a t t e r  p l a c e s  on r i s k  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ,  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  
p r i o r i t i e s ,  and e v a l u a t i o n  o f  imp1 emented s t r a t e g i e s  and t a c t i c s  i n  
terms o f  r i s k  r e d u c t i o n .  The a c t u a l  p r a c t i c e  i n  t h e  agenc ies  and 
i n s  t i  t u t i o n s  t h a t  implemen t programs appears t o  i g n o r e  even t h e  
management concepts  i n  t h e  e x i s t ' n g  h ighway s a f e t y  1 i t e r a t u r e  as we1 1 
as t h e  r i  s k-managemen t concep ts .  Programs a r e  s t a r t e d  as e x t e n s i o n s  
o r  expans ions  o f  e x i s t i n g  a c t i v i  t;/. R i s k  i d e n t i  f i c a t i c n  i s  n o t  
accompl i s h e d ,  and e f f e c t i v e  e v a l  u a t i o n  i s  a r a r i  t y .  
We be1 i e v e  a m a j o r  reason f o r  t h i s  i s  t h e  f a i l u r e  o f  s t a t e s  and 
l o c a l  u n i t s  o f  government t o  unde rs tand  the  system n a t u r e  o f  t h e i r  
high~ay s a f e t y  e f f o r t s .  There i s  n o t  s u f f i c j e n t  a t t e n t i o n  g i v e n  t o  
, , 
t h e  o r g a n i z a t i c n  and ~ a n a c e m e n t  o f  highway s a f e t y  grograms o r  t o  Tne 
i n s t i t u t j c n s  t h a t  implement zroararns. T h i s  l a c k  o f  sys tern management 
c ~ n t r i b u t e s  t o  (1) f a i l u r e  t 3  a e  e x i s t i n g  i n = o m i a t i c n ,  and ( 2 )  f a i l ~ r e  
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t o  develop new informatjon through risk identification and evaluation. 
Part of this  fa i lure  can be attributed t o  a general tendency of 
the pub1 i c ,  poi icymakers, and the highway safety community t o  ignore 
existing information on risk. Basic information on t r a f f i c  crash 
causation has demonstrated the importance of  the human element. 
This has been reinforc2d by more recent, more detailed studies. 
Despite this  information, the tendency has been t o  allocate resources 
t o  engineering or technological solutions focused on the highway and 
the vehicle, with only limited resources available t o  examine the 
human element. We do - n o t  suggest that vehicle safety or programs 
designed t o  improve the highway envircnment cease or be reduced. We 
do suggest that  as pr ior i t ies  for allocaticn of resources are estab- -
lished, suff ic ient  attention be given the human element. I n  the next 
tden ty years the Highway Transportation Sys tem wi 11 experience some 
major transit ions.  Whether those can be accompl ished with minimal 
disruption of our society will depend not only on technological 
solutions b u t  cn increased understanding of patterns of  human 
behavior. 
The past practice o f  underestimating the human factor i s  reflec- 
ted also in the desisn a n d  development of programs thzt focus on 
drivers and other systern users. Conventional wisdom has prevailed; 
most new programs look renarkably 1 i ke the o l d .  Policymakers have 
re1 ied on the Traffic Law Sys tern as a r i s  k-managernen t inechan ism. 
The TLS has been expected to be a deterrent t o  unsafe driving acticn. 
Sanctions resulting from enforcement action have been expected t o  be 
perceived by drivers as surrogate ri sks. Drivers , in making "rational " 
decisions about courses o f  action, have been expected t o  consider the 
unfavorable outcomes. Since the risk of a crash has apoarently n o t  
been suff ic ient  t a  influence the behavior of many drivers,  the risk 
- * 
o f  legal action has been used as an additional decision f a c d r .  r e  
success o f  this  stratsgy ias Seen l i ~ i t e d ,  Secausz the level o f  
~nforcemevt is  jenerli ly so low as t o  maKe the sarrogat2 risk n o t  
significantly more important than the crash r isk in the human decision 
process, 
A more fundamental problem exis ts .  The use o f  the l q a l  system 
i s  basically a negative reinforcement. A s ignif icant  body o f  psycho- 
logical l i t e r a tu re  establishes that  humans respond more effect ively 
to positive than negative reinforcement. Ne need t o  look for  a l t e r -  
native s t rategies  for  driver control that rely more on incentives 
than disincentives. 
There are l imits on the use of the criminal sanction. General 
and unrestricted use of the law system for a l l  aspects o f  driver 
control i s  l ikely t o  exceed those l imits.  A 1  ternatives t o  the c lass ic  
operations of the t r a f f i c  law system are needed. 
Since use of the Traff ic  Law System has been the primary risk- 
management strategy a t  the s t a t e  and local leve l ,  a l ternat ive s t r a t -  
egies are needed for highway safety,  in general, n o t  jus t  for legal 
system act ivi ty;  
The problems d i sussed  above stem from a lack of theory t o  focus 
action. They are d i rec t  products of the fa i lure  t o  use existing 
information and knowledse effectively.  
7 . 2  Needs Analysis 
This section outlines what needs t o  be done t o  overcome the 
ri sk-managemen t problems identified in the preceding section. The 
resulting statanent of highway safety needs i s  a f i r s t  step toward 
development of a se t  of top-ievol requirements for managing crash 
risk.  Further analyses of problems and needs are necessary t o  develop 
nore comprehensive a n d  detai led s tatemen t s  of requi rements. The  
needs discussed below address the three categories 9 f  3robl ems that  
were described above, i. e .  : 
( I )  the description o f  the Highway S a i e ~ y  Process ( 3 S i )  
( 2 )  aecisicn-making within the % S P ,  2 n d  
( 3 )  cornrn~n icaticn l ~ t i  t h i n  the 3S? .  
7 . 2 . 1  Eescription of  the Hiohway Safety Process. The ESP 
and i t s  individual parts  should be described w i t h  respect t o  i t s  
composition, functions,  and outputs. A conc~ptual  framework such as 
the one presented in chapter 4 .0  of t h i s  paper i s  the f i r s t  s tep  in 
development of such a system descr ip t ion,  b u t  more deta i led  descrip- 
tions are  needed. 
The f i r s t  spec i f i c  need i s  t ha t  each element and i t s  components 
be iden t i f i ed  and described. The conceptual frariework described i n  
chapter 4 .0  iden t i  f i e s  classes o f  components (e .  g. , the HTS, RMSs) 
and gives examples of lower-level components (e .  g. , dr ivers ,  auto- 
mobile manufacturers, driver 1 icensing agencies). Addi t icnal  
groupings and c l a s s i f i c a t i ons  of components need t o  be developed and 
expanded t o  include each component whose a c t i v i t i e s  a re  believed t 3  
have any s ign i f i can t  impact on HSP operations. 
Next, i t  i s  necessary t ha t  the functions o f  the HSP be iden t i -  
f ied  in hierarchical  form. Some top-level functions iden ti f ied else-  
where in .chis report  include the provision of f a s t ,  convenient trans-  
portation and the maintenance of HTS d i s u t i l i t y  a t  a  soc ie ta l ly  
acceptable level .  Lower-level functions of the HTS were sa id  to 
include the design, constructicn,  operation,  and support of automo- 
b i l e  equipment and highways. The primary functions o f  RMSs were 
iden t i f i ed  as r i sk  iden t i f i ca t ion ,  r i sk  p r i o r i t i z a t i on ,  resource 
a l loca t ion ,  development of s t r a t eg i e s  and t a c t i c s ,  imp1 ernentation and 
operation of programs, and evaluation. The functions of one spec i f i c  
RMS, the Tra f f i c  Law System were iden t i f i ed ,  discl~ssed b r i e f l y ,  and 
re la ted  t o  the primary functions of RMSs in general. Similar b u t  
more deta i led  descript ions of HSP functions must be developed so t ha t  
a l l  s ign i f i can t  ac t lv i  t i e s  pert inent  t o  the generation and control o f  
HTS d i su t i l i cy  a re  known anc  related t o  HS? objectives.  
When the comD0nent.s and functicns of the HSP nave been defined, 
:hey must be i n  terpglated t o  form a ce ta i led  szructure of  tne process. 
Esc: rop-level function qust ke related to  every ocher too-level 
function, and the components involved in the performance o f  that  
function must be identified.  Similarly, interfunctional relation- 
ships must be developed among lower-level functions, so tha t ,  u l t i -  
mately, a  network of  functions can be created. Such a  netr~ork 
would, among other things, enable one t o  determine how any given 
act ivi ty  performed by any given component might a f fec t  other 
ac t iv i t i e s  and components, and would thus provide a  major tool for  
the practice of risk management. 
The l a s t  major need for  describing the HSP i s  t o  define i t s  
outputs. I n  the case of the HIS, this  means s ta t ing  the u t i l i t i e s  
and d isu t i l  i  t i  es associated with i t s  various modes of operation, 
i t s  components, and  i t s  function. For example, driving a t  a  high 
speed in a  large "luxury" car on an in t e r s t a t e  highway has a  pos- 
i t ive  u t i l i t y ,  not only t o  the driver and his passengers who want t o  
minimize travel time, b u t  t o  organizations that  manufacture and 
support the equipment and f a c i l i t i e s  involved in such usage of the 
HTS. Even a  direct  disuti  1 i  t y  (e. g .  , a serious crash) that  some- 
times occurs as a  consequence of  this  mode of operation may have 
u t i l i t y  t o  some segments of society (e.g. , automobile repair compan- 
i e s ,  hospital workers). I t  i s  essential  to risk management that  the 
nature of the s ignif icant  u t i l i t i e s  and  d isu t i l  i t i e s  associated 
with the operational modes of the HTS be specified in relationship 
t o  the various classes of individuals and organizations that  receive 
the u t i l i t i e s  and d i s u t i l i t i e s .  The etiology of crashes i s  an impor- 
tant  element of this  " o u t p u t  definit ion" requirement vis-a-vis the 
HTS, b u t  i t  i s  clearly only one of many elements. 
I t  i s  necessary that  HTS d i s u t i l i t i e s  be s tated n o t  only in 
terms o f  the losses associated with a ?ar t icu lar  event b u t  in terns 
o f  the probabi 1 i  t y  ( i .  e. , r i sk)  that  the event wi 1 1  occur. Further, 
t o  evoke an effective risk-management resoonse, HTS d i s ~ t i l i t i e s  
.c must be described i n  relation t o  other disaxili  t i es  (s. g .  . I i r e ,  
disease) a n d  rheir  associated r isks .  
The outputs of RNSs are control forces desianed t o  maintain 
acceptable HTS d i su t i l i t y .  As such, they are more difficu: t t o  
describe t h a n  the outputs of the tiTS, because i t  i s  necessary t o  
define not only the i r  nature and origin b u t  their  purposes, z f fec ts ,  
and costs. Thus, for example, a control force i n  the forn of a 
driver license suspensidn imposed by an administrative agency nust 
be examined t o  identify i t s  purpose ( o f ,  say, preventing crashes 
involving teen-aged drunk d r ive r s ) ,  i t s  effectiveness in accornplish- 
ing i t s  purpose, and the total  cost of RMS resources expended in 
applying that  force. I t  i s  also inportant t o  identify any negative 
effects associated with application of that forc2 (e .g . ,  the viola- 
tion of fundamental constitutional r ishts  by denial o f  due process). 
Finally, the specific nature of society 's  "outputs" must be 
know. These should be described in terms of required reductions in 
specific risks and in terms of what constitutes acceptable control 
forces for such risks.  
Meeting the above needs wi 11 produce a ccmprehensive and detailed 
description of the Highway Safety Process. Kept up t o  date, the de- 
scription will provide a running history of the constituents, object- 
ives, a n d  outputs of the HSP, a n d  thus will comprise the f i r s t  basic 
ingredient fa r  desicjning, operating, and evaluzticg programs o f  r isk- 
management. 
7 . 2 . 2  Decision-Yaking Within the Highway Safety Process. 
Factors important in deciding h o w  t o  deal with HTS risk must be 
identified and described. Three specific needs are germane t o  
decision-making within the HSP. 
The f i r s t  need relates t o  formation o f  perceptions abour: the 
outputs o f  the H I S  a n d  RMSs. I t  was noted earl i e r  i n  th is  report 
that oerceived risk often does n o t  ecual actual ri 'st a n d  that per- 
ceptions a o o u t  u t i l i 3 e s  o f  the HTS a n d  disurili.cies o f  QMS control 
forces nay also be inacclclrat.. :+US, there ; s  a need :o d e t e r ~ i n e  
the nature o f  sccietal  , 4T5,  a n d  ?WS oerceptions af the risks a ~ d  
u t i l i t i e s  of the HTS and RMS control forces, and t o  understand how 
those perceptions are formed. I t  i s  necessary t o  know,  for  example, 
how perceptions o f  crash risk due to  speeding vary with demographic 
characteristics and whether speed "traps" are more acceptable t o  
some groups of drivers than t o  others. 
The concept of maximum tolerable disut i l  i t y  due to crashes was 
introduced in Chapter 4.0 as an essential element o f  highway safety.  
There i s ,  therefore, a need t o  describe th is  reference value of  
disuti lf ty for different groups of individuals from the HTS, RMSs, 
and society in general. The need for such knowledge i s  fundamental 
because i t  forms the basis for  determining the specific objectives 
of RMSs a t  any p o i n t  in time. Combined with information a b o u t  actual 
and perceived d i s u t i l i t y ,  i t  allows one t o  ascertain i f  society 's  
safety requirements are being net and the extent t o  which control 
forces should be applied t o  meet those requirements. 
For example, knowledge tha t ,  a1 1 things considered, the require- 
ment that an average dr iver 's  chances o f  being kil led i n  a crash 
over a driving lifetime n o t  exceed one in 1,000, when they are 
actually more than 2 5  in 1,000, could have very s ignif icant  imp1 i -  
cations for r i  sk-managemen t. Such know1 edge would indicate that 
RMSs were n o t  sa t i s fac tor i ly  accompl ishing the i r  objectives, since 
actual risk greatly exceeds that  which i s  acceptable, and perceived 
risk i s  much lower than actual risk. On the other hand, a finding 
that  drivers who use a heavily patrolled roadway during nighttime 
hours can expect. to be involved in some kind of serious crash once 
i n  every 1,000,000 t r ip s ,  when thei r safety requirement is  one serious 
crash in 100,000 t r i p s ,  might indicate a misallocation of police re- 
sources. In  e i ther  case, maximum tolerable d i su t i l i t y  must be known 
i n  arder t o  neasure ZMS perfornance. 
The las rneed  i n  this  category i s  t o  understand how iecisicns 
a b o u t  respcnses t o  risk are made. I n  the case o f  the HTS, th is  
neans, for example, that  one lmderstand why one dr iver ' s  response tc~ 
a given perceived risk will be r isk avoidance, while another dr iver ' s  
response will be t o  accept the risk.  3y the same token, the public 
in one jurisdiction may demand immediate action against a given 
perceived r i sk ,  b u t  the same risk in another jurisdiction 'may 
leave the public apathetic. Finally,  one police agency may respond 
t o  a given increase in perceived risk by allocating more patrol cars 
t o  a given s t retch of highway; b u t  a police agency i n  another, 
apparently similar,  jurisdiction may take no  action a t  a l l  t o  deal 
with the same amount o f  increase in risk.  Thus, there i s  a need t o  
k n o w  the s ignif icant  factors that lead t o  such wide differences in 
responses t o  the same perceived r i sk ,  and t o  know h o w  to manage 
these factors so as t o  obtain optimal responses from rhe decision- 
makers . 
7.2 .3  Communication Within the Highway Safety Process. 
The accumulation of a body of knowledge about the nature and effects  
of the HSP will be o f  l i t t l e  use unless such kncwledge i s  dissemin- 
ated and understood by the components of  the process. Effective 
means for accurately communicating needed information within the HSP 
i s  thus a basic requirement for risk-management. 
Three specif ic  needs are  genera t~d  by this  general requirement. 
F i r s t ,  there i s  the necessity t o  deternine the nature of information 
needed by each component of the HS?. I n  general, each component 
will need a t  l eas t  some of each type of information defined by rhe 
above specif ic  requirements, b u t  the depth and scgpe of the informa- 
tion will vary greatly among components. For example, the information 
needs of t r a f f i c  court judges with respect t o  identification of risk 
due t o  drunk-driving are different  than the information needs of the 
automobile designer. Borh need t o  know abour the masnitude o f  the 
risk associared with various blcod a1cohol concentrations, b u t  the 
designer needs more detailed and  precise information about how 
a:  coho1 affeczs venicie-dri ver int2ractions a n d  thereby increases 
crasn risk.  dcwever, r r a f i i c  court judges need a more in-deoth 
explanation of  the effects  of a given treatment regimen for alcoholic 
dri vers . 
Individual s and organ i zations that  are often not considered t o  
be a part of  the YSP should also be provided information about high- 
way safety and the i r  role in it. For example, physicians should be 
aware that certain types of in juries are more 1 i kely t o  appear than ' 
other injur ies  and should be prepared t o  identify and t r ea t  those 
injur ies  when examining a crash victim. 
Secondly, the appropriate form and method of delivery of the 
information nust be determined for each com~onent of the HSP. For 
example, the automobile designer might best be reached through tech- 
nical reports and journal a r t i c l e s ,  while t r a f f i c  court judges might 
respond bet ter  to an intensive seminar involving colleagues a n d  other 
peers with specialized know1 edge about a1 coho1 -re1 ated crashes and 
treatment methods for alcoholism. The mass media would be a bet ter  
vehicle for informing segments of the general pub1 i c  about alcohol- 
crash r isk and the responses of RMSs t o  that r isk.  
Finally,  continuing communications programs niust be designed 
and implemented. The programs must provide needed information in 
effective form t o  a l l  components of the Highway Safety Process. 
7 . 3  Summary and Concl usions 
Our new conceptual framework has been used t o  analyze major 
problems a n d  needs in managing crash risk. Examination of the past 
operation of the HSP reveals a range of problems inhibiting the 
effect ive management of risk. The problem fa11 within the follow- 
ing three categories : 
(1) the descriotion o f  the societal  process ( i . e .  , the 
Highway Safety Process j through which the disuti  1 i t i e s  
o f  highway crashes are generated a n d  control 1 ed, 
( 2 )  decision-making within the Highway Safety Frocess ( d S ? ) ,  
an CI 
( 3 )  cmmun :cation 1wi th 'n the H z ? .  
M a j o r  problems c o n t a i n e d  i n  these t h r e e  c a t e g o r i e s  may be 
l i s t e d  as: 
D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t h e  HSP 
The components o f  t h e  H S 2  a r e  n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  and desc r ibed .  
r The f u n c t i o n s  o f  t h e  HSP a r e  n o t  i d e n t i f i e d  and desc r ibed .  
0 A d e t a i l e d  s t r u c t u r e  r e l a t i n g  t h e  components and f u f i c t i o n s  
has n o t  been developed. 
r The o u t p u t s  o f  t h e  process a r e  n o t  d e f i n e d .  
Dec is ion -Mak ing  
r The n a t u r e  o f  p e r c e p t i o n s  abou t  t h e  HSP and i t s  o u t p u t s  
have n o t  been determined and i t  i s  n o t  unders tood  how 
these p e r c e p t i o n s  a r e  formed. 
a Maximum t o l e r a b l e  d i s u t i l i t y  due t o  highway crashes has n o t  
been desc r ibed .  
r The process th rough  which d e c i s i o n s  about  how t o  respond 
t o  c rash  r i s k  has n o t  been d e s c r i b e d  and i t  n o t  understood.  
Corrnun i c a t i o n  
a The n a t u r e  or' t h e  i n f o r r n a t i o n  needed by each ccmponent 
o f  t h e  HSP has n o t  been determined. 
8 The a p o r o p r i a t e  f o r m  and method o f  d e l i v e r y  o f  needed 
i n f o r m a t i o n  has n o t  been determined.  
@ C o n t i n u i n g  commun i c a t i o n s  programs t o  p r o v i d e  needed 
i n f o r m a t i o n  i n  e f f e c t i v e  fo rm t o  a l l  components o f  t h e  
HSP have n o t  been developed. 
M a j o r  needs i;i highway s a f e t y  have been i d e n t i f i e d .  Wi th  r e s p e c t  
t o  t h e  HSP as a  whole ,  thesz  needs may be s t a t e d  as: 
a A comprehensive t h e o r y  o f  highway s a f e t y  s n o u l d  be  
deve l  oped. 
0 The p e r c e p t i o n  o f  h ishway c rash  r i s k  s h o u l d  be made more 
accura te .  
a The HSP and i ts components s h o u l d  be adequa te l y  descr ibed.  
r E x i s t i n g  knowledge s h o u l d  be used. 
r RF?C a c t i o n s  s h o u j d  be eva lua ted .  
Nith respect to the Highway Transportation System ( H T S ) ,  
major needs in risk management are: 
0 Components should be more ful ly  identified and described. 
0 Operations should be more fu l ly  identified a n d  described. 
0 User decisions should be understood. 
Ut i l i t i e s  should be described in operational terms (e.g. ,  
the reasons for  risk-taking or safe  driving).  
0 Disu t i l i t i e s  due t o  crashes should be adequately identified 
and described in operational terms tha t  wi 11  support r isk- 
management actions. 
Within the Societal component of the HSP, major needs are: 
0 Risk perception should be made more accurate. 
0 The processes through which perceptions are formed should 
be described a n d  understood. 
0 Methods for  changing perceptions should be developed. 
Major needs of Ri sk4anagement Systems have Seen identified as : 
0 RMSs should be identified and  de,r"ined. 
0 RRSs should engage i n  system management. 
0 Risk-management action by s t a t e  and local units of 
government should be increased. 
0 The process of risk man agemen t shoul d be fol 1 owed. 
0 Information on the effectiveness of risk-managemen t 
s t rategies  a n d  tact ics  should be provided t o  RMSs. 
A wider range of  risk-management s t rategies  should be 
considered and less re1 iance placed on traditional 
countermeasures . 
0 The effectiveness of the ccntrol forces of RMSs should be 
determined and made known t o  the pub1 ic.  
@ Public support of control actions should be increased by 
developing control forces that do n o t  i n  themselves 
generate excessive disut i  1 i  t y  . 
I t  i s  cmcluded that there is  also a c lear  need for  a m r e  
formalized a n d  extensive analysis of risk management ieeds,  and f c r  
the development of focused 2rograms t o  meet tnose needs. That slrch 
an analysis has n o t  Seen csnducted i n  the   as t i s  due in large 7arT 
t o  t h e  l a c k  o f  an adequate t h e o r y  o r  conceptua l  framework as a b a s i s  
f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  needs. 
8.0 IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Prior chapters have examin'ed the theoretical framework of  the 
highway safety process and discussed top-1 eve1 problems and  needs. 
These discussions are necessarily general and somewhat abstract. 
However, the conceptual framework and associated theory froin 
related f ie lds  are n o t  mere abstractions or methodological toys. 
They have import and application for  the practi t ioner.  
This chapter presents some brief examples t o  i  11 us t r a t e  the 
imp1 ications of the conceptual framework for  the f ie ld of highway 
safety. The i 11 ustrative examples are in tended only t o  stimulate 
thought. They do n o t  represent the breadth or depth of the concep- 
tual framework. They are glimpses of what can be developed i n  the 
future by thinking more broadly about the highway safety process. 
8.1 How About  Decreasina Ut i l i tv?  
As we examine the conceptual framework, i t  can be seen 
that  the operaticns of the Highway Transportation System are i n -  
fluenced by the u t i l i t y  they provide society. Trips and driver be- 
haviors are associated with the perceived uti 1 i ty associated with 
the t r ips  or behavior. These t r ips  a n d  associated behaviors can 
lead t o  crashes and the i r  disut i l  i t i e s .  Most past highway safety 
e f fcr t s  have focused on ameliorating a loss a f te r  a crash has 
occurred, or cn deterring unsafe behaviors by the threat of t r a f f i c  
law system action or some other threat.  
The threat of t r a f f i c  law system action i s  a general deterrent. 
It flows frm the actions taken against inaividual drivers ( s ~ e c i a l  
deterrent action) and  the comrnun i c a t i o n  o f  tnose speci a1 deterrent 
actions t o  :he cub1 ic. Th 's  i s  illustrates 5eicw. 
This general deterrence functions as a surrogate risk.  The risk 
of a crash i s  perceived as t o o  remote t o  deter most drivers from u n -  
safe driving acts ,  so society creates a present "risk" t o  modify 
behavior. There ace actually many such r i sks ,  b u t  qost are n o t  as 
evident as the TLS sanction. 
1 TLS Action 1 + Public 1 1 General , 
(Special Information - 3  Deterrence 
Deterrence ) & Education 
I f  we think a b o u t  the process that  a driver goes through in 
deciding t o  cornmi t an unsafe driving ac t ,  we can describe i t  as a 
balancing of perceived u t i l i t i e s  a n d  d i s u t i l i t i e s .  
# 
The benefits of driving tinsafely are compared ~ i t h  tne potential 
negative consequences of the act. Nost countermeasures seek t o  i n -  
crease the magnitude o f  the potential negative ccnsequences and thus 
deter unsafe acts. 
Limited examp1 es appear in the 1 i  terature  of  tecnn iques designed 
t o  reduce the benefits so that  the value of engaging in the act de- 
creases. Some ti t ies  provide free taxi service f c r  individuals who 
are intoxicated on New Year's Eve t o  reduce the u t i l i t y  of driving 
whi 1 e in toxi cared. 
Training programs for emergency vehicle operators use a variety 
o f  demonstrations t o  establ ish that extreme high-speed operation pro- 
duces l i t t l e  benefit in the delivery o f  emergency services. This i s  
in tended t o  reduce the perceived t i  1 i t  of high-speed emergency 
driving. 
An aporoach that considers reducing the u t ' l i  ty  as a strategy 
t o  reduc2 risk requires i n i o r ~ a t i o n  a o o u t  the uti 1 i t y  associated with 
unsafe driving acts. Infomation i s  also needed about sa?? driving 
t o  understand h o w  other drivers reac2ed a decision n o t  t o  elgage in 
unsafe Ariving acts under t h e  same ci rcms tmces .  
The incorporation of the HTS and i t s  outputs ( u t i l i t y  - a n d  dis- 
u t i l i t y )  within she conceptual framework suggests new avenues for  
inquiry in the development of r i s  k-managemen t approaches. 
8.2 How About Non-Tradi t i  on a1 Ri s k-Managemen t Sys terns? 
We noted above the re1 iance on the t r a f f i c  law system t o  
increase the 1 i kel i hood of negative consequences for drivers who 
engage in unsafe driving acts .  Examination of  TLS operations 
indicates that  they are qui te  cumbersome. Moreover, because they 
use the criminal sanction, they are rigidly bound  by the fundamental 
protecticns of the Constitution. 
Examination of the range of existing r i s  k-managemen t systems 
suggests that  i t  may be able t o  increase negative consequences use 
of other systems and thus reduce the probability that  unsafe driving 
acts will occur. 
For example, enforcement o f  laws ~ r o h i b i  ting driving while 
intoxicated does not appear t o  occur a t  a ra te  commensurate w i t h  the 
ra te  of driving while intoxicated. Various explanations appear in 
the l i te ra ture .  One of the most frequent i s  that the pol ice are  dis- 
couraged from making ar res t s  by subsequent actions of the prosecutors 
and courts. Also, the time that  the police must spend cn a DUI case 
i s  a disincentive t o  making ar res t s .  When one tal  ks with Motor 
Vehicle Administrators , they report that  drivers who have been 
arrested are most concerned with preventing the i r  insurance companies 
from learning of the a r r e s t  for fear the i r  pol icy rates will increase 
or the pol icy w i l l  be cancel led. 
This suggests some a1 ternati  ve r i s  k-managemen t approaches that  
use the flow of information among system as suggested by the con- 
ceptual framework. ' i r s t ,  a procsdure inight be t r ied  hereby police 
tes t s  for Blood Alc3hol Concentrations ( 3 A C )  became a pub1 i c  record. 
Tbis infcrmar~ion could be nade available t o  t he  vedia, insbrance 
cmpanies, or other interested ~ a r t i e s .  T i i s  ~ s i c  i n f o r ~ a t i c n  
could form the basis for risk-management action by insurance 
carr iers  without the n e c s s i  ty of formal sanctioning by the t r a f f i c  
law system. 
Another similar thought--many s ta tes  have passed imp1 ied consent 
laws. These laws provide that  when a person operates a vehicle on 
the highways of the s t a t e ,  he has given his consent t o  a BAC t s s t  
when a police of f icer  arrests  him for a drinking-driving offense. 
Criminal and administrative penalties are provided for those who 
refuse t o  take the tes t .  I n  many s ta tes  enforcement o f  the laws has 
proved cumbersome and somewhat in e f f ~ c t i  ve. Should an approach be 
considered whereby insurance policies w o u l d  provide for  a rate  i n -  
crease or policy revocation i f  an operator refused t o  take a t e s t  
w h e n  requested? 
The use of other techno1 ogical advances suggest themsel ves. The 
ORBIS device i s  a camera system that  automatically photographs a 
vehicle that  i s  exceeding a specified speed. Use of  these devices 
has been limited because gost jurisdictions attach t r a f f i c  violation 
l i a b i l i t y  t o  the dr iver ,  n o t  the vehicle. I n  contrast ,  most insur- 
ance companies insure a vehicle and n o t  an individual. ORBIS and  
other technological sys terns can easi 1y identify vehicles via 1 icense 
plates. S h o u l d  we consider simply transini t t i n g  photographs o f  pub1 i c 
violations of the speed l i m i t  t3  insurance companies and vehicle 
owners, rather than worrying about tracking down the operator and 
proving beyond a rezsonable d o u b t  that  he was i 11 egal l y  operating a t  
an unsafe speed? 
These suggestions are raised as i l lus t ra t ion  of potential new 
counterneasures. Another asoect of the conceptual framework dictates 
that before imolementation i s  attempted, !we nus t exanine societal 
7ercepticns about the benefits of such ccuntermeasures a n d  ;he risks 
they address. Some r i  s k-managemen t aoproacnes qay be economical i y  
defensible b u t  n o t  acceptaole :9 society. F3r example, when one 
considers the t o t a l  societal c 9 s t  t?a: a chrsnic drinking driver can 
causz, a cheap countermeasure night be t o  provide him with a f u l l  - 
time chauffeur. Perhaps this  w o u l d  be cost e f f x t i v e ,  b u t  i t  i s  
doubtful i t  would be soci eta1 ly acceptable. 
8 .3  Sunmar:/ a n d  Con c1 usions 
Several bri ef exampl es were presented t o  i 1 1  us t r a t e  that  the 
new conceptual framework directs inquiry t o  areas n o t  previously 
examined in depth. Specifically,  the concept of decreasing the 
u t i l i t y  associated with unsafe driving needs t o  be examined. Also 
the functions of risk-management systems and the i r  linkages need t o  
be studied. Society's reaction t o  new approaches needs t o  be exam- 
ined before they are impl emen ted. 
Each of these three points: (1)  examining u t i l i t y ;  ( 2 )  broad- 
ening our perspective of risk-managemen t systems ; a n d  ( 3 )  ascertain- 
ing societal  response t o  new highway safety approaches before 
impl ementation, flow from an understanding of the conceptual frame- 
work. These specific points re f lec t  only a few of  the directions 
for inqui ry suggested by the conceptual framework. 

9.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This paper has examined existing theory in the f ie ld  of highway 
safety and  described a new conceptual framework for the highway 
safety process. The framework i 11 us t ra tes  the importance of under- 
standing how people make decisions a b o u t  r isk.  I t  also emphasizes 
the importance of using sound management methods in the risk-manage- 
ment process. Application of basic management methods will improve 
the operations of risk-management sys tems. 
When the conceptual framework i s  used t o  examine past and curr- 
en t problems in highway safety,  i t  ident i f ies  some research questions 
that need t o  be pursued. 
Each of the chapters raised a n d  discussed highway safety issues,  
reached concl us ions and made recommendations re1 ated t o  those issues. 
We now identify a limited s e t  of t o p  level conclusions and accompany- 
ing recormendations that  we believe are most important for immediate 
consideration. 
Conclusion. I Immediate ernphasis should be placed on develop- 
ment o f  an organized body of theory o f  highway 
safety.  
Discussion The lack of order, conflicting demands for  
resources, and absence o f  an organizing frame- 
work for  decision-making are evidence of the 
need for  a general theory and model. Ne 
offer  a conceptual framework as a s ta r t ing  
point, - b u t  much more must be done. 
?ecornmendaticn Fornal progrims designed t o  develop :heory 
should be s tar ted by the pub1 i c  and ~ r i . / a t e  
ins ti tuticns conc$med with highway safety.  
Coo~eration snoui d be encguragea b u t  i t i s  
: i ' t e ly  that the f ie ld will bene":"i frcm 
mu1 :!pie as o~ocsed t o  vonol i :hit Irograms. 
The research community should take a leadership 
role i n  encouraging the s t a r t  of a research 
program a n d  c r i t i ca l  l y  reviewing i t s  progress. 
Conclusion 11 Priority should be given t o  improving the use 
of existing knowledge a b o u t  the t r a f f i c  crash 
r i s k  and methods for managing that  risk. 
Discussion Avai 1 able evidence indicates that  societal  
perceptions of the t r a f f i c  crash risk are 
inaccurate. Traffic crashes appear t o  be 
viewed as less  important than other societal  
risks t h a t  produce less loss. A more accurate 
perception of risk i s  l ikely t o  resul t  in risk 
reduction and improvement of risk-management 
operations. 
Recommendation Formal programs should be es tab1 ished a t  the 
federal,  s t a t e ,  and local level t o  disseminate 
information on r isk and risk-management t o  
decision-makers. I t  will n o t  be enough t o  
simply transmit information. The information 
must be transmitted i n  forms that help t o  assure 
that  i t  i s  understood and thus will be applied 
t o  reduce risk. 
Ccnclusion 111 Enphasis should be placed on tinderstanding the 
role that  human factors p lay  in crash causation . - 
a n d  crash losses. Risk-managemen t s t rategies  
that  effectively deal with these factors should 
receive pr ior i ty  attention. 
Discussion Avail able infornaticn on the t r a f f i c  crash risk 
indicates that  human factors are predominant 
in t r a f f i c  crash causation. ~ h e s e  factors have 
received cnly limited attention in the l a s t  ten 
years--in the sense of rigorous systematic exam- 
ination of r i sk ,  and  development o f  risk-manage- 
men t responses . 
iur ther  identification o f  "human" risk nal/ we;! 
resul t i n  risk-manaqernm t s trateqies t h a t  focus 
on changes i n  the vehicle o r  iiShway environment 
or  b o t h .  
Recommendation The responsible federal agencies s h o ~ l  d a? locate 
siqnifican t resources f o r  research on r i sk  
iden t i f i ca t ion  and development of risk-manage- 
ment s t r a t eg i e s  focused on the human factor .  
Funding e f fo r t s  t o  es tabl ish  a  base fo r  e f f ec t -  
ive action shoul d take p r io r i ty  over funding 
conventional demonstration programs. 
Conclusion 1'1 The eneral concept o f  highway safe ty  should be i broa ened and more discipl  ines encouraged t o  study 
~roblems o i  crashes and crash losses .  
Discussion The conceptual framework i den t i f i e s  many new 
areas t ha t  must be described and studied to 
e lucidate  the highway safe ty  process. This 
inquiry should involve individuals from 
disc ipl ines  o ther  than those t r ad i t i ona l l y  
involved i n  highway safe ty  research or programs 
(e .  g. , decision t heo r i s t s ) .  
Recommendaticn Pub1 i c  and pr ivate  i n s t i t u t i ons  shoul d establ  ish 
and fund programs designed t o  apply the bes t  . - 
minds from a  wide range of d isc ipl ines  to an 
examination of crash r isk  and crash r isk  
reduction. 
In  tu rn ,  the research and academic community 
should formal ly recognize, t o  a g rea te r  ex ten t ,  
the importance of managing the t r a f f i c  crash 
r isk.  An understanding of how the t r a f f i c  
crash r isk  i s  created a n d  how i t  can be 
managed can lead to a broader understanding of 
how t o  manage r i sk  in society.  
We close th i s  paper by emphasizing our opening staternent. The 
paper has been written in the context of discovery to  r a i s e  issues 
and st imulate discussion,  and not necessar i l :~  t o  resolve questions or 
prescribe solut ions .  
Xe hope t ha t  i t  will contribute t o  same short-tsrm solut ions .  
But, more important, we hooe tha t  i t  w i l l  lead t o  development o f  a 
more vigorous cgnc2ptilal framework t h a t ,  i n  -,urn, will germit cevel- 
opment o f  more ef=ective ways of managing t<?e r isk  o f  t r a f = i c  crashes. 

Acpen d i  x A 
INFORMATI ON ABOUT TRAFFIC CRASH RISK 
Chapter 5 discussed the importance of risk i denti f i  cation 
for  the management of risk.  The r isk identification process 
must take place in a t  least  two contexts. F i r s t ,  the maqnitude 
of  the r i sk 'of  concern--in th i s  case the t r a f f i c  crash risk--must be 
examined in l igh t  of other societal r isks .  This examination leads t o  
a ranking of societal r isks t o  quide allocation o f  resources 
by society t o  deal with such r isks .  This i s  a societal decision 
process that determines relat ive importance among conflicting 
concerns. 
Second, the nature of the specific r isk must be examined i n  detail  
t o  ascertain factors that  create the risk and associated dis- 
u t i l  i t i e s .  This examination a1 lows pr ior i t ies  t o  be establ ished for 
r isk management actions,  suggests targets for counterineasures, 
provides information on  the dynamics of cause and subsequent loss 
that  shape the nature of the r isk management response, and provides 
a baseline measurement of risk that can be used i n  the evaluation of 
risk management actions that  are imp1 emen ted. 
Our knowledge of the nature and extent of the t r a f f i c  crash risk 
i s  limited, as i s  our knowledge of other similar socieral risks. 
Present data provide insights and perspectives for further 
inquiry. They suggest directions that  should be taken for  the future 
and raise  issues for  discussion a b o u t  the wisdom o f  directions 
followed in the past. The following sections present general infor- 
mation cornoaring the t r a f f i c  crash risk t o  other societal risks as !deli 
as information on t r a f f i c  crash causation. These data are n o t  dei ini-  
t ive  and  are provided t o  i l l u s t r a t e  the problem and t o  foster  discussion. 
A .  Societal 2isk of Traffic Crashes 
One of the most comolex 9roblems i n  societal science i s  develog- 
ing valid operational de4ini:ions of c o n c e ~ t s .  I n  ~ o s z  casss the 
major validity prcblen relates t o  measurement. how we choose t o  
measure a problem may we1 1 influence the outcome. For some time 
i t  has been fashionable t o  discuss t r a f f i c  safety and other areas 
of safety in terns of deaths. TO a lesser  extent safety discussions 
examine in juries a n d  property losses. Quantification o f  the number of 
deaths has proved simpler than assignment of a value to an injury 
or deterninati on of  costs associated with t r a f f i c  crash 
r isks .  Cost data and injurydata do ex is t  and are. regularly (o r  
i  rregul ar l  y ) reported. Yet deaths appear more persuasive and 
pervasive in safety discussions. 
While we do not believe that  deaths alone are an adequate 
measure of disut i l  i t y ,  i t  i s  interesting t o  compare the number of 
deaths from t r a f f i c  crashes with other "accidental" deaths. 
Table A - 1  l i s t s  causes of death by type of accident and the number 
of deaths in recent years associated with each ty?e of accident. 
This information was obtained from the 1975 edition of Accident 
Facts, a pub1  ication of the National Safety Council ( 4 ) .  
Traffic crashes are  the largest  single category of accidental 
deaths. I t  would be logical t o  expect that  the societal response 
would be t o  allocate more resources t o  deal with th is  problem than 
other risks that  produce accidental de3th. Yet, th i s  has n o t  
been done in the United States. 
Examples of this  discontinuity come quickly t o  rnind. Seven 
t r a f f i c  deaths occur for  every f i r e  death. Yet, most communities 
have f i r ?  departments funded and staffed a t  a level nearly equal t o  
their  law mforcement agencies that  have the primary responsibility 
for t r a f f i c  control. The l a w  enforcement agencies must also deal 
with general crime, qaintenance of  order a n d  community servic? 
demands. 
I n  racsnr years 3ubiic -- ~ e r c ~ p x i c n s  of tne crime problm - 
have i r e c u e i ~ l y  resul ted i n  d i  iers i c n  o' p o l  ice r~sources  frcim trsf'i r 
duty  t o  roore senera1 1 aw en'3rc2rnen"Luncti ons . T h i s  xrend started 
Accidental Deaths According to the international List of Causes o f  Death  
Deaths are classified on the  basis of the  Eighth Revision of "The  International 
List of Diseases and Causes of Death", which became effective in 1968. This  revision 
provides for a class of deaths  due  to injury when it cannot be determined whether 
the  death  was an  accident. suicide, or homicide. The re  were 5,149 deaths  classified 
in this category in 19:. 
Type of Accident or Manner of fnlury I 1974t  1973 1972 1971 
All Accidenlal Dealhr 104,622 115.821 115,448 113.439 
Transport accidents 50,659 59,986 60.480 58,529 
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i n  the l a t e  1960s and  continues today. The underlying 2hilosophy 
i s  reflected i n  a 1969 statenent by Chief Robert Igleburger of the 
Dayton, Ohio, Pol ice Department. 
"While t r a f f i c  moves freely and ef f ic ien t ly  in many 
sections of our urban centers,  crime continues to r i s e ,  
severe social problems prevai 1 and disorders frequently 
break o u t .  I t  seems t o  signify that  new concerns and 
pr ior i t ies  have arisen in metropol ises , " 
\fi t h  t h i s  in mind, the Dayton Pol ice Departnent recent1 y 
undertook a program of massive review of i t s  goals, 
p r io r i t i e s ,  mission and methods of operation. We re- 
viewed expectations of the community by analyzing our 
service requests, c i t izen complaints, and community 
at t i tudes and desires . .  .had we done th i s  five years 
ago, our major pr ior i ty  would have been t r a f f i c  l a w  
enforcement; our present analysis showed i t  t o  be 
repression of  criminal acti  vi ty.  and general p u b 1  i c 
service. Traffic control a n d  t r a f f i c  1 aw enforcement 
we determined could n o t  continue t o  receive the man- 
power a1 1 ocation--over 20 percent--they had previous1 y 
received". Traffic Safety 59 (June 1959): pgs 14-16. 
This coment ref lects  the reactions of a r isk manager, i n  th i s  
czse a police chief ,  responding t o  societal perceptions of the 
importance o f  various societal r isks .  Crime, i n  t h i s  case, was 
deemed more imp~r tant  than t r a f f i c  crashes. That soci eta1 
- 4  perceptions re f lec t  th i s  value probably cannot be disputed. I ne 
accuracy of the perception and i t s  acceptance by risk managers i s  
more debatable. 
This can be i l l  ustrated by a rather intorestin! outcome of a 
study conducted in S t .  Louis, Misjouri. The study, designed t o  
improve a1 location of pol ice resources , star ted with the premise 
that  not a1 1 crimes were the same. For example, not a i l  events 
described as robberies present the same risk t o  the public. 
Some involve \lioienc2 and in,jury, while others,  a l t h o u g h  serious,  
do  n o t  have the same level o f  r isk.  The study examined a ser ies  o f  
crimes and rated :heir seriousness , based on the characteris t i c s  c f  
the event ( i  . e . ,  was there injury, was a weapon ~ s e d ,  ldnat )was xhe 
value of the property stolen, e t c . ) .  To quantify seriousness the 
authors, Nelson tiel 1 er and  Thomas McEwen, used the Sell in-No1 fgang 
scale t o  assign a numerical value t o  the character is t ics  associated 
with each event. The same scale was also applied t o  t r a f f i c  crashes 
occurring during the study period. One would have expected a signi- 
f icant ly lower score for  t r a f f i c  crashes, as one corn~onent of the 
scale--intimidation--does not apply in the case of nondeliberate 
crashes. The resul ts  were surprising: "The injury and property 
loss occurring in the average t r a f f i c  accident i s  over f i f t y  percent 
more serious than that  occurring in the average Part I offense." 
( ~ o u r n a l  of Criminal Jus t ice ,  Vol . 1 , !lo. 3 pg 2 4 2 ) .  (Part  I offenses 
refer  t o  the crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assaul t ,  
burglary, larceny over $59, and auto thef t  that  are reported in 
Part I of the Uniform Crime Reports). 
While th i s  study cannot be viewed as def ini t ive,  i t  strongly 
suggests the inaccuracy of the societal perception that  crime i s  a 
greater personal risk than t r a f f i c  crashes. 
I n  the f i r s t  part of th i s  discussion, data that  contrasted 
t r a f f i c  crash deaths with other accidents: deaths were presented. 
Next, the risk of t r a f f i c  crashes was contrasted with that  of crime. 
Other comparisons can be drawn. Table A - 2 ,  re~roduced frcm reference 
(I), shor*/s t h a t  rnotor vehicle crashes rank as the leading cause of 
death in the age group 5-24 years, and are a major cause of death 
through middle age. 
The data presented i n  t h i s  section are i l l u s t r a t i v e  o f  the 
relat ive importance of t r a f f i c  crashes as a societal r i sk .  They 
are not def in i t i  ve and, given present publ  i c perceptions, apparently 
not well understood. This suggests that  the relat ive risk of  t r a f f i c  
crashes must be better defined and communicat2d so that  nore accurate 
publ ic perceptions can be developed. As l o n g  as the r isk o f  t r a f f i c  
crashes is. perceived as less important zhan other r i sks ,  r isk 
managment e f for t s  focused on t r a f f i c  crashes wi 11 be inadequate. 
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A . 2  The Nature of the Traffic Crash Risk 
Knowledge of the nature of r isk i s  necessary for  the risk 
management process. We need to know what causes t r a f f i c  crashes 
and the associated losses in order t o  reduce the risk o f  crashes 
and crash loss. 
The state-of-the-art  of know1 edge about injury-producing 
mechanisms and the dynamics of the crash phase i s  f a r  advanced, 
compared t o  knowledge about t r a f f i c  crash causation. I n  real i  t y ,  
we do n o t  know enough about e i ther  area. 
The development of risk-management s t rategies  i s  highly 
influenced by perceptions of what causes t r a f f i c  crashes. I t  
will be useful as we continue our discussion of highway safety 
theory t o  have a commcn understanding of t r a f f i c  crash causation. 
The study of t r a f f i c  crash causation i s  s t i l l  in a develop- 
mental stage. Advances have been made in explanations of crash 
causation. General findings have been rep1 i  cated. Yet, there i s  
no cjeneral s c i en t i f i c  agreement on methods of inquiry or the 
analysis. Findings of recent studies should be regarded as 
indicative rather than defini t ive descriptors of the causes of 
t r a f f i c  crashes. 
In this  context, summary findings are  presented here from a 
study on Traffic Crash Causation conducted by the Indiana Unf versi ty 
Ins t i tu t e  for Research in Pub1 i c  Safety under the sponsorshi[, of 
the National Highway Traff ic  Safety Administration. These data 
represent the most recent results of this  multi-year study. Prior 
findings have been reported in a ser ies  of  reports (See reference 
25, our thanks t o  John R .  Treat for  providing these data,  which w i l l  
appear in a report t o  be published soon ) .  
The srudy was conducted i n  Yonroe Counyy, Indiana, over a 
period of  more than f i i / e  years. T?e gerleral objective o f  rhe 
project, was to sa t i s fy  national needs for  data rqard ing  accident 
causation and crash avoidance. Data were collected on  three levels  
of d e t a i l ,  as shown i n  Figure A-1. Cnly crashes tha t  were invest i -  
gated and reported by pol ice  agencies in Monroe County were consid- 
ered in the stady. A t  level A ,  police reports  of accidents,  dr iver  
l  icense da ta ,  and vehicle reg i s t ra t ion  data were collected.  A t  
level B, technicians were sent  t o  the scene o f  crashes shor t ly  a f t e r  
they occurred to conduct an independent on-scene investigation.  The 
1 eve1 - C  invest igations were conducted subsequently and involved a 
vul t i d i s c ip l  inary team of professions , many of whom held doctorates 
or advanced degrees. Quant i t a t ive  measurements of a number of 
variables were made. Yehicles were removed t o  a garage f a c i l i t y  
and examined by automotive engineers. Drivers par t ic ipated in 
vision and dr iver  knowledge tes t ing.  Accident reconstruction 
spec i a l i s t s  made detai led scene drawings and ass is ted  in the 
recognition, col l ec t ion ,  and in te rpre ta t ion  of physical evidence. 
Following the data collect ion process, the mu1 t i d i s c ip l  inary 
teiirn convened as a group to develop a cl incia?  a s s e s s ~ e n t  of 
accident causes associated w i t h  the crash. Causative factors  are 
1 i s ted  in three primary categories:  h u m a n  f a c to r s ,  environmental 
f ac to rs ,  and vehicular fac tors .  A detai 1 ed def in i t ional  hierarchy 
of fac tors  o r  causal f ac to r  t rees  was developed within each of the 
primary categories l i s t e d  above. (Deta i ls  of the def in i t ional  
approach are  provided i n  reference 2 6 ) .  
I n  a s ingie  accident i t  was possible fo r  more than one fac to r  
t o  play a causative role.  Thus, a s ingle  crash m i g h t  have a human 
f ac to r ,  a vehicle f a c to r ,  and an environmental fac tor  c i ted  as 
causal factors.  
A causal f ac to r  ra t ing systen was used t o  exoress the degree 
of confidence of the investigators in thei r conclusions. Concl usions 
Here expressed as -ce r ta in  when tnere was n o  doubt as t o  the f a c t o r ' s  
role. Fact3rs wer? assessed as ? r z b a o l e  w e n  they )were consiaered 
highiy l ike ly  3ltnoucn n o t  de i in i :~ .  A ooss'ble ra t ing das dsed t o  

designate factors of pcten t i  a1 relevance, a1 thcugh the evidence did 
not substantially support their  existence and/or involvement. i a i  l -  
ure t o  assign a factor a t  the possible level reflected a judgment 
that i t s  involvement was highly un1  ikely. 
The findings o f  the study are presmted in overview form i n  
Figure A-2 ,  Figures A-3,  A-4, a n d  A-5 detai 1 the major causal 
factors within each primary category. Note that the human factors 
l is ted are defined as the direct  causes of crashes. The study also 
considered indirect causes, such as human conditions or s ta tes  which 
adversely a f fec t  the ab i l i ty  o f  the driver as an information process- 
or and vehicle controller. These fac tors ,  which include categories 
such as fatigue, driver experience, and alcohol impai rment, are 
sufficiently remote in their  causal relationship that i t  becomes 
d i f f i cu l t  t o  assess their  involvement with certainty.  (Summary 
discussion of this  complex concept in this  limited presentation i s  
1 i  kely t o  introduce misunderstanding. A reader desiring more 
detailed infomation i s  referred t o  pages 41-48 in reference 2 5 ) .  
Caution should be taken in interpreting the data presented in 
the figures. Human factors were found  t o  be the predominant 
causative factor. I t  i s  n o t  correct t o  assume from this  finding 
that the only risk management response t o  a human fai l ing should be 
directed a t  the driver. Some underlying conditions that  lead t o  
human fai lure  nay be most effectively addressed by modification of 
e i ther  the vehicle or the roadway environment or b o t h .  I t  i s  also 
important t o  note that  most o f  the vehicular factors noted were 
maintenance-related defects, not manufacturing defects. Thus, i t  
we1 1 nay be that the best way t o  address some vehicle defscts will 
be through ri;k management actions targeted a t  the vehicle owner 
3r operator. 
'dhile these findings come cram a relative11 large s t ~ d y  and  
ref lect  perhaps the best at/ai i a b l  e information on t r a f f i c  crasil 





t o  the ent i re  United States or used t o  generalize in precise terms 
( i . e . ,  93% of  t r a f f i c  crashes are caused by human fa i lu res ) .  The 
data, however, are remarkably consistent with other more 1 imi ted 
studies in the United States and in other countries as well, The 
data have also shown a consistency from year t o  year !within the 
study even t h o u g h  b o t h  the observers and the observed condi t icns 
have varied. 
Perhaps the most s ignif icant  point, for purposes of  this  
discussion, i s  the relat ive involvement rates of  the human, 
vehicle, a n d  environmental factors. In  assessing risk management 
approaches, establishing p r io r i t i e s ,  and  developing s t rategies  a n d  
t ac t ics ,  i t  will be desirable t o  keep in mind the general trends 
as shown by the data from th is  study. 
A . 3  Sumarv and Conclusions 
Risk management requires an understanding of the nature and  . 
extent of the t r a f f i c  crash risk. F i r s t ,  the magnitude of  the risk 
rnust be known t o  assess i t s  importance relative t o  other societal 
r isks.  Second, characteristics of the risk must be known t o  
select  and establish pr ior i t ies  among risk management s t rategies  
and  tactics a n d  t o  evaluate the effect i  veness of selected approaches. 
Current data demonstrate that t r a f f i c  crashes are a major 
source of death and injury when compared with other types of 
accidents. Crashes appear t o  present a greater risk than crime in 
some sett ings.  Even when compared with a l l  causes of death in the 
United States ,  t r a f f i c  crashes are a major societal risk. 
Examinaticn o f  data that  describe t r a f f i c  crash causation 
reveals that human factors are f a r  more frequently involved in a 
causative role i n  t r a f f i c  crashes than ei ther  environmental or 
vehicle factors. The re1 ative rol? of human, envircnmentai , a n d  
vehicular factors must be csnsiaered i n  developing risk xanagenent 
s t ratsgies  and  estabi ishing pr ior i t ies  amons approaches. 
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